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THE INJURY OF BIRTH: MINNESOTA'S STATUTORY
PROHIBITION OF POSTCONCEPTION
NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
Negligence that interferes with a person's decision to reproduce may result in
the somewhat unpalatable "damage" of a child being born. An injury of birth
action can arise from negligence that induced a couple to conceive or a woman
to bear an unwanted child. In either case the plaintiff must assert that but for
the negligence, the child would not have been born. Recent legislation passed
in Minnesota may be interpreted as allowing recovery for the costs of rearing
an unwanted child born due to negligence that occurred prior to its conception.
Conversely, actions that involve postconception negligence, in which birth only
could have been prevented by abortion, are precluded by the legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
I fail to see how a decision on child bearing becomes less impor-
tant the day after conception than the day before. Indeed, if one
decision is more "fundamental" to the individual's freedom than
the other, surely it is the post conception decision that is the more
serious. I
There is no joy watching a child suffer with genetic or congenital
anomalies.2 If the birth of a child could have been prevented but for
a doctor's failure to properly counsel a couple on their reproductive
options or carry out their decisions, many states allow recovery for
the injury of birth in a tort action.3 Minnesota became a leader in
recognizing these actions over fifty years ago.4 The state continued
1. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 776 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
2. See Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 NJ. 53, 63, 432 A.2d 834, 842 (1981) (holding
that the pleasures of raising a child do not offset the extraordinary medical expenses
of raising a child with cystic fibrosis). Some of the birth defects that may result in
injury of birth lawsuits are: albinism, which causes a total lack of pigment in the body
coupled with various eye defects, see THE MOSBY MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 23 (1985);
cri du chat syndrome, a rare disease which causes larynx defects, low birth weight, a
small head and wide set eyes that do not work together, id. at 134; cysticfibrosis, which
causes glands to produce thick releases of mucus resulting in absorption problems
and chronic lung infections, id. at 208; Down's Syndrome, which causes mental retarda-
tion and numerous physical defects including bowel defects, heart disease, respira-
tory infections and vision problems, id. at 237; erythroblastosisfetalis, a form of anemia
in newborns who have Rh positive blood, but whose mothers are Rh negative, id. at
268;fetal hydantion syndrome, a complex of defects including lack of nails on the digits,
mental retardation, slowed growth and heart defects, id. at 288; hemophilia, a bleeding
disorder in which there is a lack of one of the blood clotting factors, id. at 335;
neurofibromatoss, which causes fiberlike growths, brown spots on the skin and defects
in the muscles, bones and abdominal organs, id. at 500; polycystic kidney disease, a fatal
disease which causes enlarged kidneys with many cysts, id. at 583; Spina Bifida, which
causes a gap in the bone surrounding the spinal cord sometimes resulting in paralysis
and loss of bowel and bladder function, id. at 681; rubella-related syndrome, which
causes birth defects including heart disorders, cataracts, deafness and mental retar-
dation, id. at 650; Tay Sachs disease, a nerve breakdown disorder which causes progres-
sive mental and physical retardation, spasticity, dementia, paralysis and early death,
id. at 708; and Thalassemia major, which causes anemia and iron deposits in major
organs necessitating blood transfusions, id. at 717. For additional information relat-
ing to birth defects that may result in injury of birth lawsuits, see Fryns, Chromosomal
Anomalies and Autosomal Syndromes, 23 BIRTH DEFECTS 7-32 (1987) (discussing clinical
recognition of genetic and congenital disorders); Opitz & Herrmann, The Study of
Genetic Diseases and Malformations, 13 BIRTH DEFECTS 45, 49-66 (1977) (same); Note,
Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Coun-
seling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1491 nn.15-16 (1978) (same).
3. See infra notes 73, 161, 165-66, 170 and accompanying text.
4. See Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934)
(recognizing that a fraud action for misrepresentation of guaranteed sterility could
be brought against a doctor who performed a vasectomy).
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THE INJURY OF BIRTH
to expand this area of law as recently as a decade ago.5 More re-
cently, the state passed legislation prohibiting tort actions for post-
conception negligence that interfered with a woman's abortion
decision.6 The interests of health care providers and women making
procreative decisions have been affected by the statute and two Min-
nesota Supreme Court decisions. 7
This Note will examine the constitutionality and providence of
Minnesota's prohibition of postconception injury of birth actions.
The Note will also outline the circumstances under which a cause of
action sounding in tort for the injury of birth may be maintained
under the present law. Part I of the Note provides background on
the exploding technologies of genetic counseling and prenatal diag-
nosis, including who uses these services and the affect these services
have on reproductive decisionmaking. Part II briefly traces the de-
velopment of the right of individuals to make procreative decisions
free from interference from the state. Part III of the Note attempts
to clarify injury of birth terminology by providing clear definitions of
the various claims based on the premise that these cases, although
somewhat revolutionary in tort law, fit within the traditional confines
of negligence. Part IV analyzes Minnesota's early experience with
injury of birth cases. Part V discusses Minnesota's statutory prohibi-
tion of postconception injury of birth actions and the constitutional
challenge to the statute. Part VI examines the remaining liability in
Minnesota for causing the injury of birth. Part VII suggests that the
statute is improvident in light of policy considerations and provides a
model for improving the statute. The Note concludes that even
though Minnesota's statute has been held to be constitutional, pru-
dential and policy considerations warrant revision to allow actions
arising from negligence prior to the third trimester of pregnancy.
I. GENETIC COUNSELING: USE OF AN EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY
Amniocentesis, genetic counseling and the legalization of abortion
have allowed prospective parents some measure of control in
5. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Martineau v.
Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 247 N.W.2d 409 (1976).
6. See MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (1986). Minnesota has joined four other states in
enacting legislation prohibiting postconception injury of birth suits. See IDAHO CODE
§ 5-334 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130 (Vernon 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 21-55-2 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (1986). Similar legislation has
been introduced in 21 others states. See Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against
Legislative Curtailment, 100 HARVARD L. REV. 2017, 2019 n.7 (1987). A California stat-
ute prohibits only suits by a child against its parents. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.6 (West
1982). A Maine statute specifically recognizes injury of birth actions. See ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(2) (1986).
7. See Pratt v. University of Minn. Affiliated Hosps. and Clinics, 414 N.W.2d 399
(Minn. 1987); Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986).
19883
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preventing the birth of handicapped offspring. In the last thirty
years, prenatal and preconception diagnosis and counseling have be-
come highly sophisticated and accessible to the public. 8 Paralleling
the growth of these new technologies and the various reproductive
options they make available are decisions by the United States
Supreme Court that protect the exclusive right of individuals to
make their own decisions about conceiving and bearing children.9
As a result, potential liability for interfering with procreative deci-
sions may cohere to many members of the health profession who are
involved in genetic counseling.O
Although genetic counseling and prenatal diagnosis are appropri-
ate in many situations, women who have a substantial risk of bearing
affected children because of illness," advanced maternal age' 2 or
8. The first American genetic counseling center was founded by Charles B. Dav-
enport in 1915. From its association with the eugenics movement, which advocated
regulated marriages, sterilization, immigration restrictions and permanent confine-
ment of certain individuals, genetic counseling fell from favor as contrary to the na-
tion's protection of the basic civil liberties. Wariness over the early misuse of genetic
information slowed the growth of the field until the late 1950's. Since then, great
strides have been made in understanding human genetics. See PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAV-
IORAL RESEARCH, A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
GENETIC SCREENING, COUNSELING, AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS 10 (U.S. Gov't Printing
Office, Wash., D.C. 1983) [hereinafter REPORT].
9. See infra notes 28-51 and accompanying text.
10. Liability is not limited to genetic specialists or physicians. Nurses too must
be concerned, due to the great amount of time they spend with patients in all aspects
of care. See, e.g., Tammelleo, R.N. Sued for "Wrongful Birth & Life".- Dilemma, 26 REGAN
REP. NURS. LAw 1, 1 (Feb. 1986) (discussing Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528
(N.C. 1985), where a family nurse practitioner was sued for negligently failing to
advise a woman of the availability of amniocentesis); Thomson, The Role of the Occupa-
tional Health Nurse in the Prevention of Birth Defects and Genetic Disorders, 31 OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH NURS. 28, 28-31 (1983) (role of the nurse in genetic counseling includes risk
assessment, referral, identification of environmental hazards and education); Wil-
liams, Understanding Genetic and Birth Defects - An Essential Skill for the Occupational
Health Nurse, 31 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH NURS. 24, 24-27 (1983) (because nurses are
regarded as a source of health information, knowledge about birth defects is
essential).
11. See, e.g., Dyer, Elevated Maternal Serum Alpha-Fetoprotein Levels and
Oligohydramnios: Poor Prognosis for Pregnancy Outcome, 157 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY 336, 336-39 (1987); Robertson & Shulman, Pregnancy and Prenatal Harm to
Offspring: The Case of Mothers with PKU, 17 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23, 23-33 (1987);
Sachs, Acquired Immunodeficiencv Syndrome: Suggested Protocolfor Counseling and Screening in
Pregnancy, 70 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 408, 408-11 (1987).
12. Roghmann, Reassurance Through Prenatal Diagnosis and Willingness to Bear Chil-
dren After Age 35, 73 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 760, 760-62 (1983).
Survey of 2,209 women age 25-45 asked about their reproductive plans and
whether prenatal reassurance might influence their reproductive intentions.
25 percent of 35-39 year olds and 12.8 percent of 40-45 year olds indicated
an increased willingness to have children if they were reassured that their
baby had none of the birth defects detectable by amniocentesis.
[Vol. 14
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THE INJURY OF BIRTH
the prior birth of affected children1S are particularly likely to seek
these services. Several factors may influence a couple's decision to
have more children after the birth of a genetically handicapped child,
including the desire for children, past reproductive experiences and
maternal age.14 Regardless of the degree of recurrent risk and the
availability of prenatal diagnosis, couples are more likely to
reproduce again when the affected child was their first rather than
later born. 15
A. Prenatal Diagnosis
Although availability of prenatal diagnosis16 (most commonly
through amniocentesis 17 and ultrasound8) is not alone determina-
Id. Another study, based on 10,000 amniocenteses, suggests that because women
age 30-35 have more children, maternal age indicators should be reduced to age 30
by the year 2000. This would result in a substantial increase in the number of
Down's Syndrome pregnancies identified. The study recommends lowering the ma-
ternal age indicator to 34 immediately. Crandell, Lebherz & Tabsh, Maternal Age and
Amniocentesis: Should This be Lowered to 30 Years? 6 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 237, 241
(1986). See Goodwin & Huether, Revised Estimates and Projections of Down Syndrome
Births in the United States, and the Effects of Prenatal Diagnosis Utilization, 1970-2002, 7
PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 261, 261 (1987) (total estimated cases of Down's Syndrome to
peak at 5,100 in 1990 - increased use of amniocentesis by women over 30 could
reduce this by one-third). See also infra notes 108-51 (discussing Hickman v. Group
Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986), where a 34-year old woman gave
birth to a child with Down's Syndrome).
13. Steele, Effect of Sibship on Reproductive Behavior of Couples After the Birth of a Genet-
ically Handicapped Child, 30 CLINICAL GENETICS 328, 328-34 (1986). See also infra
notes 177-97 (discussing Pratt v. University of Minn. Affiliated Hosps. and Clinics,
414 N.W.2d 399 (Minn. 1987), where a woman gave birth to a second child with
congenital defects despite genetic counseling).
14. Steele, supra note 13, at 328-34.
15. Id.
16. The first type of prenatal diagnosis is diagnosis of the pregnancy itself. Neg-
ligence in diagnosing a pregnancy is actionable in many states, but Minnesota's
wrongful birth statute may be interpreted to preclude such actions. See infra notes
165-69.
17. Amniocentesis involves inserting a needle into the mother's womb and with-
drawing amniotic fluid containing fetal cells. Laboratory testing of fetal cells can
detect all known chromosomal defects and the majority of metabolic defects. Recent
Development, Htashington Recognizes Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life - A Critical Analy-
sis, 58 WASH. L. REV. 649, 655 n.39 (1983); see Chemke, Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic
Diseases, 22 ISRAELJ. MEDICAL SCIENCES 207, 207-09 (1986) (over 100 metabolic dis-
eases are detectable).
Amniocentesis may, however, involve some risk of spontaneous abortion,
although the extent of that risk is not clear. In a study of 691 pregnancies after
amniocentesis, the rate of spontaneous abortion was found to be much higher in
women who had one or more previous spontaneous abortions. This study was care-
ful to point out that the high rate might have been due to the age and previous
pregnancy history of the women, rather than the amniocentesis procedure. See Esrig
19881
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tive of a couple's decision to have another child,19 many couples at
risk seek early prenatal diagnosis to help them have an unaffected
child.20 In one study of forty women who had borne children after
giving birth to a child with Down's Syndrome, half had amni-
ocentesis in subsequent pregnancies.2 1 As noted earlier, ultrasound
scans are also very effective in determining recurrence of a particular
affliction.22 The use of ultrasound and amniocentesis together pro-
vides couples at risk with the maximum amount of information about
their unborn children. Today, prenatal diagnosis is widely used to
detect a wide variety of afflictions.
B. Preconception Diagnosis and Counseling
Preconception diagnosis and counseling may be distinguished
& Leonardi, Spontaneous Abortion After Amniocentesis in Women with a History of Spontaneous
Abortion, 5 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 321, 327 (1985).
18. Ultrasound measures the reflection or transmission of ultrasonic waves to
detect anatomical abnormalities. It is often used in combination with amniocentesis
and presents no discernible risks to the woman or the fetus. See Note, supra note 2, at
1493 n.22.
The results of ultrasound testing in cases of suspected fetal anomalies are accu-
rate 99% of the time when specific anomalies are suspected. The ability of ultra-
sound to detect additional defects, however, is questionable. See Manchester,
Accuracy of Ultrasound Diagnoses in Pregnancies Complicated by Suspected Fetal Anomalies, 8
PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 109, 112 (1988).
19. See Alper, Genetic Counseling, 5 DERMATOLOGIC CLINICS 43, 47-48 (1987).
"IThe burden of a disease is something to which every couple can relate. They
know how the disease has affected the living situation of their family, and that is very
meaningful." Id. at 48.
20. Super, Schwartz, Elles, Irvinson, Giles & Read, Clinic Experience of Prenatal Di-
agnosis of Cystic Fibrosis by Use of Linked DNA Probes, 3 LANCET 782, 782 (1987). This
article discusses study of 96 families at risk of having a child with cystic fibrosis who
were counseled about prenatal diagnosis. All women with a prenatal prediction of
cystic fibrosis decided to terminate their pregnancy. One pregnancy was terminated
because of a 50/50 chance of a child afflicted with cystic fibrosis. Id. In addition to
risking an affected child, not having children, or adopting, amniocentesis provides
couples at risk with another option. Now they can "have as many unaffected children
as they desire . . . through prenatal diagnosis and elective abortion of affected fe-
tuses." Rimoin, The Delivery of Genetic Services, 13 BIRTH DEFECTS 105, 109 (1977).
21. Elkins, Stovall, Wilroy & Dacus, Attitudes of Mothers of Children With Down Syn-
drome Concerning Amniocentesis, Abortion, and Prenatal Genetic Counseling Techniques, 68 OB-
STETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 181, 181 (1986) (half of these said they would seek abortion
if Down's Syndrome was confirmed). Sixty-six percent of the women polled received
genetic counseling prior to conception of further children. Id. See also infra notes 23-
27 (discussion of preconception diagnosis and counseling).
22. See supra note 18. But see Tolmie, Melby, Stephenson, Doyle & Connor,
Jlicroencephaly : Genetic Counselling and Antenatal Diagnosis After the Birth of an Affected
Child, 27 AM. J. MEDICAL GENETICS 583, 588 (1987). A study was conducted of 15
families with one microcephalic child, using ultrasound scans in 21 subsequent
pregnancies. The study found diagnosis difficult before the last trimester because
head growth did not slow until then. See id. at 588-90.
[Vol. 14
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THE INJURY OF BIRTH
from prenatal diagnosis in that it occurs prior to conception of fur-
ther children. The techniques used are family history23 and chromo-
some analysis of the parents and any affected children.24 Pre-
conception counseling is often recommended for the parents of af-
fected children to inform them of the recurrence risk and the option
of prenatal diagnosis. 2 5 Such counseling may have a profound influ-
ence on a couple's decision to attempt to conceive other children.
26
23. A genetic history involves "constructing a pedigree and listing the patient's
near relatives by sex, age, and state of health, with particular reference to the occur-
rence of relevant diseases in the family." FINEBERG & PETERS, GENETIC COUNSELING
AND SCREENING: STANDARDS OF CARE, CUSTOMARY PRACTICE, AND LEGAL LIABILITY,
PERSONAL INJURY DESKBOOK 173, 176 (1985). The family history provides useful in-
formation to the health care provider that allows the practice of preventive medicine.
See Gelehrter, The Family History and Genetic Counseling: Tools for Preventing and Managing
Inherited Disorders, 73 POSTGRADUATE MEDICINE 119, 126 (1983). Genetic counselors
convey information regarding the probability that a couple will have an affected
child, the severity of the child's affliction and its effect on the family and the possibil-
ity of treating or preventing the affliction. See id. at 123.
24. Many diseases have been classified as genetic based on specific patterns
which enable experts to estimate the risk of inheriting the disease. In order for some
traits or diseases to appear, two recessive genes are necessary. When both parents
contribute genetic material containing the same variation, the gentic disorder is
termed autosomal recessive. Examples of autosomal recessive conditions are cystic
fibrosis, phenylketonuria (PKU), Tay-Sachs disease and sickle-cell anemia. If two car-
riers mate, each child they have has a 25% chance of having the condition, a 50%
chance of becoming an unaffected carrier, and a 25% chance of not having the ab-
normal gene in question. See REPORT, supra note 8, at 11-13.
Carriers of autosomal dominant genes can pass on the disorder even if their
mates do not carry the variant gene. A couple in which one person is a carrier and
the other is not has a 50% chance of having a child with the disorder with each
pregnancy. Examples of autosomal dominant disorders include Huntington's dis-
ease, achonodroplastic dwarfism and polycystic kidney disease. Id.
25. Sadovnick, Baird, Hall & Keena, Use of Genetic Counselling Services for Neural
Tube Defects, 26 AM.J. MEDICAL GENETICS 811, 811 (1987). This study indicated that
use of genetic counseling services is influenced by the type of handicap and whether
the child was born alive or stillborn. Genetic counseling was most often sought after
the birth of a live infant with handicaps. See id. at 816.
26. Swerts, Impact of Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Diagnosis for Down Syndrome and
Neural Tube Defects, 23 BIRTH DEFECTS 61 (1987). Two studies evaluated the impact of
genetic counseling and prenatal diagnosis on family planning decisions of parents of
a child with Down's Syndrome or neural tube defects. Id. Each study compared par-
ents who received genetic counseling to parents who already had amniocentesis per-
formed and parents who had received neither genetic counseling nor amniocentesis.
Id.
The information given during the counseling session(s) influenced more
than half of the parents of a child with Down syndrome, to decide in favor of
further pregnancies. In the group of parents having a child with a neural
tube defect the information received at the genetic counseling session(s)
even had a more important effect: 80 percent decided to plan another preg-
nancy. Results of both studies clearly indicate that for more than half of the
families the availability of prenatal diagnosis was of crucial importance in
the decision to plan future pregnancies.
Id. at 61-62.
1988]
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Thus, preconception counseling can be essential in helping couples
make informed reproductive decisions.27
II. PRESERVING CHOICE IN PROCREATIVE DECISIONMAKING
Technology has afforded individuals a large measure of control
over their reproductive options, improving the ability of couples to
conceive and bear children2 8 as well as avoid conception and birth.29
The strength of these options often becomes the subject of contro-
versy and litigation. This controversy often pits the consumer or dis-
tributor of these new technologies against the state or groups
advocating the interests of large sectors of society.
Voluntary sterilization 30 of men 3 ' and women3 2 is widely accepted
as a method of birth control. Voluntary sterilization has been
accepted fairly recentlySS and remains controversial even today.34
27. Care should be taken to distinguish the term "informed decisionmaking"
from "informed consent," a legal term of art that implies rights and duties in the
physician/patient relationship that may not be applicable to pure counseling situa-
tions. See infra notes 177-90 and accompanying text.
28. In vitro fertilization, fertility drugs and surrogate parentage are just a few of
the techniques that afford couples previously unable to have children the opportunity
to reproduce. See generally Fletcher, Moral Problems and Ethical Issues in Prospective
Human Gene Therapy, 69 VA. L. REV. 515, 530-31 (1983); Note, Surrogate Parenthood-
An Analysis of the Problems and a Solution: Representation for the Child, 12 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 143, 145-48 (1986).
29. Sterilization, contraception and abortion are all methods of birth control.
They differ in degree of acceptance, however. Sterilization has been a widely ap-
proved method of birth control since the 1940's. See infra note 33. Today almost
everyone would agree that a person should be free to choose to be sterilized. But see
infra note 34. Many other contraceptive techniques have also gained wide approval.
These techniques range from abstinence and withdrawal (which might not even be
considered "birth control" by some individuals) to IUD's and morning after pills
(which are considered abortion by some individuals). Abortion is not considered an
acceptable method of routine birth control. It remains, however, the final method of
preventing birth and as such must be considered birth control. See Holt, Wrongful
Pregnancy, 33 S.C. L. REV. 759 n.l (1982). Abortion is the most controversial method
of birth control because it allows women to choose to prevent birth after conception.
30. Involuntary sterilization has been performed on the mentally defective and
prisoners. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942) (Court invali-
dated statute calling for sterilization of persons convicted of three felonies involving
moral turpitude); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (Court upheld statute al-
lowing involuntary sterilization of institutionalized mental patients). It is extremely
doubtful that the decision in Buck would be upheld today.
31. Sterilization of a man is accomplished by vasectomy, an operation involving
removal of a section of the vas deferens under local anesthesia. THE MOSBY MEDICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA 773 (1985).
32. Women are sterilized by tubal ligation, a procedure slightly more compli-
cated than vasectomy that involves tying off the fallopian tubes. Id. at 754.
33. Doctors have been performing sterilizations since the turn of the century. See
Vasectomy: The V Word, St. Paul Pioneer Press, Feb. 1, 1988, at BI, col. 3, B2, col. 2. It
used to be much more difficult, however, to obtain a sterilization.
[Vol. 14
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol14/iss3/5
THE INJURY OF BIRTH
Although no statute attempting to prevent voluntary sterilization has
been challenged in the United States Supreme Court, it is doubtful
that such a statute could survive substantive due process challenges
today.
The Supreme Court has struck down statutes interfering with the
dissemination of contraceptive information and devices35 or restrict-
ing the sale of contraceptives3 6 to unmarried people.37 Today no
person may be prohibited from buying, selling or using contracep-
tives.3 8 Thus, the protection of reproductive autonomy extends be-
yond the "marital bedroom" of Griswold "to the doctor's office, the
hospital, the hotel room or as otherwise required to safeguard the
right to intimacy involved."
3 9
The right to privacy first found in Griswold and its progeny was
significantly expanded to the abortion context in 1973. The abor-
tion decision is made by the woman with advice from her physician.4O
For women, the "Rule of 120" prevailed. This meant that if the woman's
age times the number of children she had did not equal 120 or more, she
could be considered for sterilization.
For men, it was more up to the whim of the doctor whether he thought
it was proper to sterilize a particular patient. For example, a urologist might
only consider sterilizing a man 40 years old with five children because he
himself was 40 years old with five children.
Id. at B2, col. 2. The Association for Voluntary Sterilization was formed in 1943 to
make sterilization available to those who wanted it. Id. The association is still in
existence today as the Association for Voluntary Surgical Contraception with head-
quarters in New York. Id.
34. For example, the Couple-to-Couple League believes that deliberate steriliza-
tion is incompatible with a positive view of life and promotes natural family planning.
Id. at B2, col. 1. The group also has physical and moral objections to sterilization,
believing that antibodies built up against sperm could cause a breakdown in the im-
munological defense system and that God made our bodies perfect so surgery should
only be performed when necessary. Id.
35. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (Connecticut statute
which forbade the use of contraceptives and forbade aiding others in contraceptive
use held unconstitutional).
36. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 689-91 (1977) (statute which
attempted to limit sales of contraceptives by forbidding all but licensed pharmacists
from selling contraceptives held unconstitutional).
37. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440-42 (1972) (Massachusetts statute
which permitted physicians and pharmacists to distribute contraceptives to married
persons only held unconstitutional).
38. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 687 (Griswold protects individual decisions regarding
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the state).
39. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973).
40. Several attempts have been made to require the consent of third persons
before an abortion may be performed. The Supreme Court has held that neither the
father of an unborn child nor the parents of an unemancipated minor have an abso-
lute veto over the abortion decision. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462
U.S. 416 (1983); Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of
Kansas City v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). More recently parental notification stat-
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Although the states are not required to fund abortions,41 they may
not interfere with the abortion decision by imposing regulations that
discourage abortions.42 The Court in Roe v. Wade 43 held that regula-
tions protecting the fetus prior to the third trimester of pregnancy
are impermissible.44 A companion case, Doe v. Bolton,45 permitted a
physician to consider all emotional, psychological and familial fac-
tors in deciding whether or not to perform an abortion.46
Regulations that act as a substantial impediment to making abor-
tion decisions and that are not necessary to achieve a compelling
state objective have been invalidated by the courts. 47 Statutes pur-
porting to gain a woman's informed consent through provisions that
discourage abortion, rather than providing information, are not rele-
vant to informed consent and thus advance no legitimate state inter-
est. 4 8 Thus, provisions requiring doctors to distribute materials
relating to the "anatomical and physiological characteristics" of a fe-
tus, the "serious complications" of the abortion procedure or the
alternatives to abortion have been struck down as "poorly disguised
elements of discouragement for the abortion decision."49
Popular opinion clearly has some effect on judicial and legislative
bodies. It is fairly clear that the majority of Americans believe in
retaining the abortion right in some form.50 Under what circum-
stances abortion is favored is less clear.51 Although public support
utes have been challenged. See Note, Parental Notification Prior to Abortion: Is Minne-
sota's Statute Consistent With Current Standards, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 653 (1988).
41. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977). More troubling was a later deci-
sion that the state need not even fund medically necessary abortions. Harris v. Mc-
Rae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980).
42. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 759 (1986); Akron, 462 U.S. at 444-45 (1983).
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44. Id. at 162-64.
45. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). The Bolton case struck down a Georgia statute which
placed numerous procedural burdens on a woman seeking an abortion including al-
lowing abortions to be performed only at accredited hospitals and requiring the con-
sent of additional doctors. Id. at 192-200. One of the factors a physician was allowed
to consider under the statute was the risk of fetal defects. Id.
46. Id. at 192.
47. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759.
48. Akron, 462 U.S. at 44-45.
49. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763.
50. On the 15th anniversary of Roe, a nonpartisan study was released by the Na-
tional Abortion Rights Action League showing that 88% of those polled favored re-
taining the abortion right in some form. Abortion Support High, But Doubts Remain, Poll
Says, St. Paul Pioneer Press, Jan. 21, 1988, at IA, col. 1. Only 10% of those polled
said they opposed abortion under all circumstances. Id. at 6A, col. 3.
51. Although 39% of those who believed the abortion right should be retained
thought abortions should be permitted for "any woman who wants one," 49% be-
lieved abortions should be allowed only in certain circumstances. Id. at 6A, col. 3.
The two situations offered by the poll were abortions to terminate pregnancies re-
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THE INJURY OF BIRTH
of the abortion right remains high despite eight years of an adminis-
tration with a strong anti-abortion platform, that public sentiment
may not be reflected in legislation prohibiting actions for the injury
of birth.
III. ABOUT CONFUSING TERMINOLOGY: A NEW FRAMEWORK
This Note refers to several terms that have been confusing52 prac-
titioners and the courts for years and introduces new terms that, it is
hoped, will end the confusion.53 By the term "injury of birth," this
Note refers to two broad categories of negligence actions involving
suiting from rape or when a woman's health was seriously endangered. Id. While the
poll did not ask whether or not abortion should be allowed when the fetus is afflicted
with a serious genetic disorder, one might suppose that the support of the abortion
right in that circumstance would be something higher than 39% and lower than 88%
of those polled.
Several state legislatures have found the physical or mental health of the fetus to
be a factor that should be considered. See IDAHO CODE § 18-608(1) (1987) (one fac-
tor doctors should consider in determining whether to perform an abortion is
whether the child would be born with physical or mental defects); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-5-1(C)(2) (1984) (medical termination of pregnancy "justified" if child would
probably have grave physical or mental defects). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
142 (1973) (American Medical Association Committee on Human Reproduction
would allow abortion when child would be born with incapacitating deformity); Note,
supra note 6, at 2027 n.59 (prior to Roe, Uniform Abortion Act permitted abortions
when child would be born with grave defects).
52. The confusion stems from two separate sources. First, the courts have been
unable to agree on the meaning of the "seemingly oxymoronic" terms wrongful
birth, wrongful life, wrongful conception and wrongful pregnancy. Gallagher v.
Duke Univ., 638 F. Supp. 979, 981 (M.D.N.C. 1986). Second, many people outside
the medical profession have trouble understanding the complex terminology and
concepts inherent in reproductive sciences. See generally Knott, Considerations in Com-
municating Genetics to the Uninformed, 13 BIRTH DEFECTS 147, 147-53 (1977).
53. The Minnesota wrongful birth statute specifically defines causes of action for
wrongful birth and wrongful life differently than most recent courts and commenta-
ries. The Minnesota Supreme Court has accepted the legislature's terminology dis-
tinguishing injury of birth actions arising from negligence prior to conception from
those arising after conception. While it is not the intention of this Note to further
confuse accepted terminology, a new framework is necessary in light of Minnesota's
approach.
Most recent courts and commentators have adopted the terminology of the fed-
eral district court in Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981), to refer
to the various negligence claims involving newborns. The Phillips court defined
"wrongful pregnancy" as an action against a physician for negligence in performing
an abortion resulting in the birth of an unwanted child. Id. at 545 n.l. Also included
in the Phillips "wrongful pregnancy" definition were cases that the Minnesota
Supreme Court has termed "wrongful conception," referring to claims involving the
birth of unwanted children due to failed contraception methods or unsuccessful ster-
ilization procedures. See id. The above actions are distinguished from a "wrongful
birth" claim brought by the parents of an unwanted child born with birth defects, or a
"wrongful life" claim brought by the unwanted child suffering from such birth de-
fects. See id. Because the Phillips court did not distinguish between the merits of
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injuries to parents and their children: negligence prior to concep-
tion, preconception negligence, and negligence after conception, postcon-
ception negligence.54
Preconception negligence claims arise from the birth of children,
claims based on whether they arose prior to or after conception, as the Minnesota
statute and courts have, this Note abandons the Phillips terminology.
Injury of birth actions were originally distinguished in part on the basis of
whether the child was born healthy (wrongful pregnancy/conception) or unhealthy
(wrongful birth/life). While wrongful birth and wrongful life actions always involve
children born with birth defects (with the exception of the "illegitimacy cases," which
have never been accepted by any court, see, e.g., Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418
(Fla. App. 1974); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963);
Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966)), wrong-
ful pregnancy/conception actions may also involve children born with birth defects.
See, e.g., LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976); Elliot v. Brown, 361
So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984); Fulton-
DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653 (1984); Comras v.
Lewin, 183 NJ. Super. 42, 443 A.2d 229 (1982); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439
A.2d 110 (1981); Stribling v. deQuevedo, 288 Pa. Super. 436, 432 A.2d 239 (1980).
Thus, that distinction is no longer particularly meaningful.
A second distinction made in these actions involves whether the child was un-
planned (wrongful pregnancy/conception) or planned (wrongful birth/life). This
distinction, however, lacks contemporary significance and places the focus on the vic-
tim's culpability, rather than the tortfeasor's. For example, a couple who underwent
sterilization or practiced some other form of contraception could be said to have an
"unplanned child" if, due to negligence, a child was born despite their precautions
(wrongful conception). Similarly, a woman seeking diagnosis of the fact of pregnancy
could be said to have an "unplanned" child, if she is pregnant and chooses to give
birth (wrongful pregnancy). A woman who undergoes an abortion procedure and
nevertheless gives birth due to a physician's negligence, could be said to have an
"unplanned" child (wrongful pregnancy). Following this reasoning, a woman who
does not wish to become pregnant and gives birth to a child with Down's Syndrome
that, but for a health care provider's negligence in failing to diagnose the anomaly,
she would have aborted could be said to have an "unplanned" child (wrongful
birth/life). The possibilities, while not infinite, are so variant as to prevent any mean-
ingful distinction based on whether the child is "planned" or "unplanned."
54. Procreative decisions made prior to conception are commonly distinguished
from those made after conception in medical literature:
At the outset, one can differentiate between decisions involving genetic risk
which are taken during the planning stage of a pregnancy and decisions taken
after the pregnancy has been confirmed. In the former case, we are dealing
with prospective parents who have to face the possibility that their offspring
may be subjected to a genetic risk. In the latter case, the prospective par-
ents may or may not have known that there existed such a possibility prior to
conception, and would have found out about it only as a result of the rou-
tine medical investigations carried out after the woman was diagnosed as
pregnant.
Humphreys & Berkley, Representing Risks: Supporting Genetic Counseling, 23 BIRTH DE-
FECTS 227, 229 (1987) (emphasis in original). Parents who know the risk prior to
conception gamble that they will have to abort an affected child. When parents be-
come aware of the risk during pregnancy, the only risk they take is that the diagnostic
test will be false positive, thus inducing them to abort a healthy child. See id.; see also
APPENDIX: THE DECISION TO REPRODUCE.
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who, but for another's negligence would not have been conceived.
This term captures actions involving children conceived due to negli-
gent sterilization procedures, failure of birth control devices and
negligent genetic diagnosis and counseling prior to conception that
induced the parents to conceive a child with severe congenital
anomalies.55
Postconception negligence claims, on the other hand, arise from
the birth of children, who, although already conceived, would not
have been born but for another's negligence. These cases involve
children born due to negligently diagnosed pregnancies, negligently
performed abortions,56 or negligent diagnosis and counseling after
conception that induces a woman to carry a child with severe con-
genital anomalies to term.
55. See, e.g., Gallagher, 638 F. Supp. at 980. In Gallagher, despite the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court's refusal to recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth, a fed-
eral district court allowed the parents' cause of action for preconception negligence
which induced them to conceive an affected child. Id. at 982. The plaintiffs gave
birth to a child who died 20 days later from multiple birth defects. Id. at 980. Doc-
tors at Duke University found no chromosomal deficiencies in the child and did not
test the parents. When the plaintiffs conceived again the doctors did not use amni-
ocentesis and a second child was born with multiple birth defects. Later, it was deter-
mined that the two children suffered from similar chromosomal abnormalities and
that the father carried the suspect gene. Id. The federal court, distinguishing the
case from Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985), reasoned:
The issue of genetic counseling makes this case unique. It appears to the
court that two types of genetic counseling currently [exist] to serve couples
in their right to plan their families. The first is pre-conception genetic coun-
seling. This type of counseling provides patients with information pertain-
ing to whether they could or should conceive. Typically, such information
relates to fertility and to the relative potential for conceiving a child with
genetic or congential defects. Post-conception genetic counseling usually
relates to tests conducted while the child is in utero, to determine if the fetus
suffers from genetic defects .... Post-conception genetic counseling is em-
ployed so that a mother may make an informed decision on whether to have
a eugenic abortion of a deformed or otherwise genetically defective fetus.
Gallagher, 638 F. Supp. at 981-82. Since Azzolino was distinguishable because it in-
volved postconception genetic counseling, the court was free to conclude that a cause
of action for the birth of an affected child due to preconception negligence was not
precluded in North Carolina. Id. at 982. The court relied, in part, on Jackson v.
Bumgardner, 71 N.C. App. 107, 321 S.E.2d 541 (1984), a preconception negligence
case involving the failure to replace an IUD which resulted in the birth of a healthy
child.
56. Most courts have not distinguished between postconception claims involving
misdiagnosed pregnancies or negligently performed abortions, and preconception
claims involving failed sterilization procedures or contraception methods. Courts
have refused to recognize such a distinction because in both instances the child is
"unplanned." See supra note 53 (criticizing this distinction). The Minnesota statute
appears, however, to prohibit a cause of action for the birth of a child due to the
failure of an abortion procedure or a misdiagnosed pregnancy because these claims
necessarily involve the assertion that the child would have been aborted. See infra
notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
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Injury of birth does not refer to claims that a person negligently
failed to treat or caused injury to a fetus in utero.57 The "injury" in
injury of birth cases is the birth itself, that results in unwanted finan-
cial, emotional and physical damages to the plaintiffs. Necessary to
any injury of birth claim, therefore, is the assertion by the plaintiff (in
some cases the child itself) that the child was unwanted.58
Injury of birth cases divide neatly based on whether or not the
child was conceived at the time the negligence occurred. Nonethe-
less, a few cases still escape these divisions. Extraordinary cases have
involved both preconception and postconception negligence.59
These cases should be treated as two separate instances of negli-
gence, combining the suits of the injured parties without permitting
double recovery for the same injury. In addition the child's claim
that its parents, rather than the health care provider, were negligent
in allowing conception or birth logically follows from the other
57. Claims that a person affirmatively injured an unborn fetus have been well
accepted for over 40 years. See D. DOBBS, R. KEETON AND R. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS § 55, 367-70 (5th ed. 1984). Recently, claims have arisen from
fetal injuries caused by amniocentesis. See, e.g., McBride v. Brookdale Hosp. Medical
Center, 130 Misc.2d 999, 498 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1986); Wheeldon v. Madison, 374
N.W.2d 367 (S.D. 1985).
58. Although it may stigmatize the child, basing the distinction on whether the
child is "wanted" or "unwanted" is a way to distinguish between injury of birth
claims in terms of their merits. In any injury of birth case, the parents must allege
that the child was unwanted to plead sufficient damages. This is true regardless of
whether the procreative choice was interfered with prior to or after conception and
regardless of whether the child was born healthy or unhealthy. Parents who undergo
sterilization procedures or take contraceptives do not "want" to conceive children.
Yet if a child is conceived, they may "want" the child and cannot be forced to miti-
gate damages by aborting the fetus or by putting the child up for adoption once
born. Still, a cause of action should lie as long as the child was unwanted prior to the
point of injury (in this case prior to its conception) and the health care provider's
negligence has prevented the parents from exercising their fundamental right to
carry out procreative decisions preventing the conception or birth of the child.
The stigma of having to say a child is unwanted is inherent in the claim itself. As
such, it serves to prevent frivolous claims by making parents of children (especially
those born healthy) carefully consider the effect that the lawsuit will have on their
child. This soul searching might lead some potential claimants to reach the conclu-
sion that their child was always wanted - for it is the parents bringing the action, and
not the courts, who stigmatize the child. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d
303, 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967) (unplanned child who learned of parents' suit
should not be protected from "emotional bastardry" by court because stigma is no
greater than for other unplanned children).
59. See, e.g., Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979). After
fathering two children with neurofibromatosis, Mr. Speck underwent a vasectomy.
His wife became pregnant, indicating that the vasectomy was unsucessful (failed ster-
ilization/preconception negligence). Mrs. Speck then underwent an abortion that
failed and was told that she was no longer pregnant, despite her protests to the con-
trary (failed abortion and misdiagnosed pregnancy/postconception negligence).
Mrs. Speck then gave birth to a third child with neurofibromatosis.
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claims, but strong public policy arguments have universally pre-
cluded such claims.60
Courts vary widely on the application of damage principles in in-
jury of birth cases. This variance is perhaps due to confusion over
the various titles given these actions. For example, many courts do
not award the costs associated with pregnancy and childbirth in cases
involving postconception negligence inducing a woman to carry a
child with congenital anomalies to term. Courts have reasoned that
because the woman wanted to give birth when she conceived, she
was not damaged in that manner. 6' This kind of reasoning may re-
flect outdated notions of birth control, as the woman must claim that
but for the physician's negligence she would have aborted the fetus
in any postconception negligence case. Therefore, she should be en-
titled to the costs associated with pregnancy and childbirth minus the
cost of the foregone abortion. Similarly, no court has awarded an
affected child damages for pain and suffering or loss of earnings,
although these children surely suffer and may never be able to work.
Several commentators have provided detailed analysis of the per-
plexing topic of injury of birth damages, which is not a major focus
of this Note. 62
IV. RECOVERY FOR THE INJURY OF BIRTH: MINNESOTA'S
EARLY EXPERIENCE
Aside from a constitutional challenge to Minnesota's statute
prohibiting actions for postconception negligence,63 and a case at-
tempting to avoid the statute by grounding its claim in negligent
nondisclosure,64 Minnesota's case law regarding the injury of birth
has been limited to preconception negligence cases involving failed
sterilization procedures. A careful examination of these cases
reveals some of the policy considerations important in examining the
providence of Minnesota's prohibition of postconception injury of
birth claims.
60. See infra notes 106-107. But see infra notes 162-64 (Minnesota statute does not
reach child's claim that but for parents' negligence he or she would not have been
conceived).
61. The pregnancy and delivery associated with an affected child are generally no
more difficult than if the child had been normal. Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022,
1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). The Moores court held that the plaintiff's claim for
pain and suffering was properly stricken, "since Linda Moores wanted to become
pregnant and bear a child." Id.
62. See, e.g., Note, lWrongful Birth Damages: Mandate and Mishandling by Judicial Fiat,
13 VAL. U.L. REV. 127 (1978).
63. Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986) (discussed
infra notes 108-5 1).
64. Pratt v. University of Minn. Affiliated Hosps. and Clinics, 414 N.W.2d 399
(Minn. 1987) (discussed infra notes 177-97).
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Preconception negligence claims may arise in three ways: (1) fail-
ure of a sterilization procedure; (2) failure of a contraceptive
method; and (3) negligent preconception genetic diagnosis and
counseling that induces the parents to conceive a child with severe
congenital anomalies. Minnesota courts have recognized the first
type of claim explicitly and the second type by implication. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court refers to these claims as "wrongful
conception."65
The Minnesota Supreme Court heard what has generally been rec-
ognized as the first injury of birth case in 1934. In Christensen v.
Thornby,66 the plaintiff underwent a vasectomy operation upon the
advice of his physician because it was thought further pregnancies
would be dangerous to his wife's health.67 When Mr. Christensen
resumed sexual relations with his wife, she became pregnant. Mr.
Christensen alleged that his doctor had assured him the operation
was successful and guaranteed sterility, and that his wife's pregnancy
had caused him great anxiety as well as considerable expense.68 The
supreme court rejected the defendant's argument that a contract to
sterilize was void as illegal and against public policy.69
The court showed reluctance to find damages,70 however, since
Mrs. Christensen gave birth, without complications, to a healthy
child. The supreme court; in prophetic dicta, stated:
The purpose of the operation was to save the wife from hazards to
her life which were incident to childbirth. It was not the alleged
purpose to save the expense incident to pregnancy and delivery.
The wife has survived. Instead of losing his wife, the plaintiff has
been blessed with the fatherhood of another child. The expenses
alleged are incident to the bearing of a child, and their avoidance is
remote from the avowed purpose of the operation. As well might the
plaintiff charge defendant with the cost of nurture and education of the child
65. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 206 N.W.2d 169, 174-75 (Minn. 1977).
66. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
67. Mrs. Christensen had experienced great difficulties in the birth of the
couple's first child. The Christensens were advised that the birth of a second child
would put Mrs. Christensen's life in danger. Id. at 123, 255 N.W.2d at 621.
68. Although the plaintiff's allegations would appear to have supported recovery
for breach of contract or malpractice, Mr. Christensen insisted his complaint was
grounded on deceit. Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622. The court, finding no allegation of
fraudulent intent on the defendant's part, affirmed the district court's order sus-
taining a demurrer to the complaint. Id.
69. The court found no legal difference between the sterilization of men and
women, but noted that the operation was much simpler and did not require hospitali-
zation if performed on a man. Id. at 125, 255 N.W.2d at 621. The court also found
that the operation had no affect on the health and vigor of the patient either mentally
or physically. Thus, the contract to perform a sterilization was neither illegal, nor
void as against public policy. Id. at 126, 255 N.W.2d at 622.
70. The plaintiffs had sought $5,000 for anxiety and expenses relating to the
pregnancy and birth. Id. at 124, 255 N.W.2d at 621.
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during its minority.7 '
Much of the dicta of the Christensen court has been discarded72 since
the late 1960's. 73 The dicta was instrumental, however, in establish-
71. Id. at 126, 255 N.W.2d at 622 (emphasis added).
72. It is doubtful, for example, that a modern court would make a legal distinc-
tion based on whether the purpose of the operation was to protect the mother from
injury or to save the expenses incident to childbirth. One court believed that -[t]o
say, as in Christensen, that the expenses of bearing a child are remote from the avowed
purpose of an operation undertaken for the purpose of avoiding child bearing is a
non sequitur." Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App, 2d 303, 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476
(1967). Similarly, the birth of an unwanted child might be something less than a
blessed event in circumstances where the parents are extremely poor, already have a
large family or the child is born with an affliction. The effects of an unwanted preg-
nancy on a woman were noted by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973):
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful
life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical
health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all con-
cerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of
bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise,
to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and
continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
Id. at 153.
73. Since the late 1960's no jurisdiction that has heard a wrongful conception
claim involving a failed sterilization procedure or contraceptive method has failed to
recognize the cause of action. See, e.g., Hartke v. Mckelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1983) (laproscopic cauterization); White v. U.S., 510 F. Supp. 146 (D. Kan.
1981) (tubal ligation); LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (D. Tex. 1976) (tubal
ligation); Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W.Va. 1967) (tubal ligation); Elliot
v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978) (vasectomy); University of Ariz. Health Sciences
Cent. v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983) (vasectomy); Wilbur v.
Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982) (vasectomy); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (tubal ligation); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33
Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976) (tubal ligation); Flowers v. District of Colum-
bia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. App. 1984) (tubal cauterization); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450
So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984) (vasectomy); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga.
441, 314 S.E.2d 653 (1984) (tubal ligation); Clay v. Brodsky, 148 Ill. App. 3d 63, 499
N.E.2d 68 (1986) (tubal ligation); Garrison v. Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)
(vasectomy); Johnston v. Elkins, 241 Kan. 407, 736 P.2d 935 (1987) (vasectomy);
Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (vasectomy); Pitre v. Ope-
lousas Gen. Hosp., 517 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (tubal ligation); Macomber v.
Dillman, 505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986) (tubal ligation);Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257,
473 A.2d 429 (1984) (tubal laproscopy); Zeller v. Greater Baltimore Med. Cent., 67
Md. App. 75, 506 A.2d 646 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (spermicide); Troppi v. Scarf,
3.1 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (birth control pills); Bushman v. Burns
Clinic Med. Cent., 83 Mich. App. 453, 268 N.W.2d 683 (1978) (vasectomy); Sherlock
v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (vasectomy); Hershley v. Brown,
655 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (insertion of tubal ring instead of agreed upon
cauterization); Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076 (Nev. 1986) (contract recovery
only for failed sterilization); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 422 A.2d 1003 (1982)
(tubal ligation); J.P.M. v. Schmid Laboratories, Inc., 178 N.J. Super. 122, 428 A.2d
515 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (condom); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 NJ. Super.
69, 344 A.2d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (tubal ligation); O'Toole v. Green-
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ing the "overriding benefits rule," which requires that the benefit of
a healthy, but unwanted child be weighed against any damage suf-
fered incident to the child's birth.74 The "benefit rule" has been in-
consistently applied by the courts to prevent unjust enrichment in
injury of birth cases. 75
In Martineau v. Nelson,76 the Minnesota Supreme Court faced a col-
lateral issue in the injury of birth arena without reaching the issue of
damages. In Martineau, a negligently performed tubal ligation re-
sulted in an unwanted child. The defendants in Martineau claimed
that the husband's failure to seek a vasectomy constituted contribu-
tory negligence and the jury agreed. On appeal, the supreme court
held that because the physicians had superior knowledge, giving con-
flicting advice on the necessity of the husband undergoing a vasec-
tomy breached their obligation to give clear information and
advice. 77 Thus, the jury's findings that the husband was fifty percent
negligent for failing to obtain sterilization was not justifed.78
The supreme court squarely addressed the issue of what damages
could be recovered in a wrongful conception action in Sherlock v. Still-
water Clinic.7 9 In Sherlock, the plaintiffs sought sterilization to prevent
further pregnancies after the birth of their seventh child in August
1970.80 A vasectomy was performed and the Sherlocks were advised
to take additional contraceptive measures until postoperative testing
determined that Mr. Sherlock's semen was free from sperm. 8' About
one month after the operation the doctor informed Mr. Sherlock that
berg, 64 N.Y.2d 427, 477 N.E.2d 445, 488 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1985) (tubal ligation);Jack-
son v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172, 347 S.E.2d 743 (1986) (failure to replace IUD);
Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976) (tubal ligation); Morris v.
Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184 (Okla. 1987) (tubal ligation and fallopian ring); Speck v. Fine-
gold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (vasectomy); Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738
(Tenn. 1987) (tubal ligation); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 248, 391 P.2d 201 (1964)
(vasectomy); Beardsly v. Wierdsman, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982) (tubal ligation). The
courts differ, however, on whether the costs of rearing a healthy child is an acceptable
element of damages. See Holt, supra note 29, at 761.
74. See Holt, supra note 29, at 780. Early courts could not accept the concept that
the birth of a normal child could be harmful. The Chritensen dicta gave rise to the
overriding benefits rule, which declared as a matter of law that the benefit of a
healthy child outweighs any damage suffered incident to the child's birth. The over-
riding benefits rule has been replaced by a rule which uses the benefit of the child to
offset or mitigate damages, rather than prevent liability. Id. at 780-82.
75. See Note, supra note 62, at 132.
76. 311 Minn. 92, 247 N.W.2d 409 (1976).
77. Id. at 105, 247 N.W.2d at 417.
78. Id. at 104-05, 247 N.W.2d at 416-17.
79. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
80. Id. at 171. Sherlock makes it clear that the purpose of the sterilization opera-
tion is irrelevant to liability. See id. at 174-75.
81. Id. at 171.
[Vol. 14
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol14/iss3/5
THE INJURY OF BIRTH
the results of his semen test were negative.8 2 The Sherlocks re-
sumed sexual relations without contraceptives and Mrs. Sherlock be-
came pregnant.
The complaint alleged that the Sherlock's physician negligently
performed the operation and was also negligent in his postoperative
care.83 The supreme court allowed damages for prenatal and post-
natal medical expenses, the mother's pain and suffering during preg-
nancy and delivery, the father's loss of consortium and the
reasonable cost of raising the child, offset by the value of the child's
aid, comfort, and society.8 4 In rejecting the Chistensen dicta,85 the
court reasoned that "public policy considerations" were not persua-
sive arguments for denying recovery to the parents of an unwanted,
healthy child conceived as a result of a negligently performed sterili-
zation operation.8 6
Analytically, such an action is indistinguishable from an ordinary
medical negligence action where a plaintiff alleges that a physician
has breached a duty of care owed to him with resulting injurious
consequences. Where the purpose of the physician's actions is to
prevent conception or birth, elementary justice requires that he be
held legally responsible for the consequences which have in fact
82. Id. In fact, the test revealed a sperm density of 5 to 10 sperm cells per micro-
scope field and that 50% of those were motile. Id.
83. See id. A claim that a vasectomy was negligently performed involves difficult
issues of proof. The area operated on is fully concealed and, in a small percentage of
cases, the operation will be unsuccessful even if performed non-negligently due to
the tendency of the severed vas to "recanalize" or rejoin. Id. at 171 n. I (citing Lom-
bard, Vasectomy, 10 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 25 (1975)).
84. Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 170-71. The jury awarded $19,500. The case was
remanded for a new trial limited to the consideration of an offset in damages for the
benefit of the child to its parents. Id. at 176.
85. See supra text accompanying note 71.
86. See Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 173-74. The Sherlock court considered, and re-
jected, arguments that awarding damages would be antithetical to the historical pur-
pose of marriage, that such claims would have the effect of reducing the child to an
"emotional bastard," that it would be unjust for the health care provider to pay all
the costs of raising the child while the parents derived all the joy of raising the child,
and that any damages caused to the parents was more than offset by the intangible
benefits gained by the birth of the child. Id. at 173-74. These arguments have been
persuasive in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128
(Tex. Civ. App. 1973) cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974); Reick v. Medical Protective
Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 517-18, 219 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1974).
The Sherlock court was particularly concerned for the well-being of the child.
The court concluded its opinion by warning the parents of the psychological conse-
quences which could result from litigating such a claim and imploring that future
parents and attorneys seriously reflect on the "silent interests of the child and . . . the
parent-child relationships that must be sustained long after the legal controversies
have been laid to rest." Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 176-77; see also id. at 177 (Sheran, J.,
dissenting).
1988l
19
McAfee: The Injury of Birth: Minnesota's Statutory Prohibition of Postcon
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
occurred.87
The Sherlock court allowed recovery for the costs of rearing a normal,
healthy child, recognizing that such costs were "a direct financial in-
jury to the parents."SS The court rejected the overriding benefits
rule, reasoning that "it would seem myopic to declare today that [the
benefits of parenthood] exceed the costs as a matter of law."89 The
court permitted the plaintiffs to recover the reasonably foreseeable
costs of rearing an unwanted child9o offset by the value of the bene-
fits enuring to the parents from the child.9l
Important in the Sherlock court's reasoning were policy considera-
tions that the court has recently questioned in light of Minnesota's
legislation prohibiting wrongful birth and wrongful life claims. First,
the court found the use of contraceptives by millions of Americans
demonstrative of the acceptance of family planning as an integral
87. Id. at 174 (emphasis added). The emphasized language indicates possible
judicial acceptance of postconception injury of birth claims prior to the Minnesota
legislation prohibiting such actions.
88. Id. at 175.
89. Id.
90. Id. These costs include foreseeable expenses incurred to maintain, support
and educate the child - costs which were considered preposterous by the Christensen
court. See id. at 177 (Sheran,J., dissenting). The "rearing liability" would not extend
beyond the child's majority, unless the child was born with genetic or congenital
anomalies. Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 176 n.Il.
91. Id. at 176. The total costs of rearing the child must then be reduced by "the
value of the child's aid, comfort and society which will benefit the parents for the
duration of their lives." Id. (emphasis added). The court valued these benefits against
the parents' life expectancy because pecuniary benefit would be minimal during the
child's minority. Id. at n.12.
The court explicitly rejected any duty of the parents to mitigate damages by
abortion or adoption. Id. That sentiment became part of Minnesota's wrongful birth
statute. See MINN. STAT. § 145.424, subd. 3 (1986) (failure or refusal to have an abor-
tion not a defense in any action and cannot be considered in awarding damages).
The doctrine of avoidable consequences would not allow recovery for damages the
parents could reasonably mitigate by aborting their unborn child or putting their
child up for adoption. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918(1) (1974). These
restrictions on recovery are designed to prevent the plaintiff from being unjustly en-
riched and the defendant from being unjustly burdened. See Note, supra note 62, at
164-70. Generally, one who suffers injury as the result of a tort is required to exer-
cise reasonable care and diligence to minimize the resulting damages. See id. The
doctrine of avoidable consequences applies after the legal wrong has occurred, but
while damages may still be averted, and denies recovery for such damages. See id. In
the injury of birth context, it has been held that the parents of an unwanted healthy
child born due to a health care provider's negligence do not have to mitigate their
damages by putting the child up for adoption. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App.
3d 698, 709, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 658 (1976); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App.2d 240,
259, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (1971). "Indeed, parents have been known to keep chil-
dren that many think should be institutionalized, e.g., mentally retarded children, not
because of any anticipated joy or happiness that the child will bring them but out of a
sense of obligation." Troppi, 31 Mich. App.2d at 259, 187 N.W.2d at 520.
[Vol. 14
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol14/iss3/5
THE INJURY OF BIRTH
part of the modem marital relationship.92 Second, it acknowledged
that "the time-honored command to 'be fruitful and multiply' has
not only lost contemporary significance to a growing number of po-
tential parents but is contrary to the public policies embodied in the
statutes encouraging family planning."93 Third, the court recog-
nized that decisions of the United States Supreme Court "suggest
that the right to limit procreation is of constitutional dimension."94
Finally, the court noted the useful deterrent effect of allowing com-
pensatory damages for the cost of rearing a child in reinforcing the
physician's duty of care from the outset of the physician-patient rela-
tionship and in preventing negligence.95 The court was not un-
troubled by the deep, painful ethical problems that injury of birth
cases pose for the courts and litigants, observing that "[t]he result
we reach today is at best a mortal attempt to do justice in an imper-
fect world."96
The discussion above has been confined to the preconception neg-
ligence claims involving sterilization procedures. By implication, the
supreme court would also recognize actions based on the failure of
contraceptive methods. Although no action of this type has been
heard in Minnesota, the legislature has codified an action based on
the failure of a contraceptive method.97 More significantly, the
supreme court has also suggested a willingness to recognize the third
type of preconception negligence: negligent preconception genetic
diagnosis and counseling that induces the parents to conceive a child
with severe congenital anomalies. A case that adequately pleads the
facts necessary to maintain such an action, however, has not yet been
heard.98
Preconception injury of birth actions while different from postcon-
ception suits, involve many of the same ethical problems and policy
considerations of their kin. Because the children in preconception
negligence actions are often born healthy, two jurisdictions continue
to apply the overriding benefits doctrine to deny damages, but allow
actions when a child is born with congenital deformities.99 Ac-
cepting that the birth of a healthy child can be a great expense, these
states ignore the compensatory nature of tort law. Minnesota, on the
92. Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 175.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 175-76.
96. Id. at 176.
97. See MINN. STAT. § 145.424, subd. 3 (1986).
98. See Pratt v. University of Minn. Affiliated Hosps. and Clinics, 414 N.W.2d
399, 402 (Minn. 1987). "If the Doctors' diagnosis was negligently made or if the
tests were negligently done, then the proper claim would have been for malpractice.
There is no such claim before this court." Id.
99. See supra note 86.
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other hand, has been placed in the awkward position of recognizing
actions that usually involve the unwanted birth of healthy children,
while disallowing actions that usually involve the birth of children
afflicted with anomalies.
V. STATUTORY PROHIBITION OF POSTCONCEPTION INJURY
OF BIRTH CLAIMS
[W]rongful birth statutes do not rationally further the goals the
proponents of the legislation offer. The justifications offered in
support of wrongful birth legislation are thin cover for an unremit-
ting protest against abortion. Wrongful birth statutes are moti-
vated by private biases and moral condemnation of abortion. Such
private prejudices do not constitute permissible bases for classifica-
tion. Because the true aim of the wrongful birth statutes is to dis-
courage women from exercising their constitutional right to make
informed procreative decisions, the statutes serve an illegitimate
purpose and thus violate the equal protection clause.100
A. Minnesota Statute Section 145.424
Minnesota Statute section 145.42410, severely limits tort actions
for postconception negligence.102 Specifically, the statute bars all
claims of an infant alleging that, but for a doctor's negligence, the
100. Note, supra note 6, at 2034 (footnote omitted).
101. The entire text of the statute reads:
Prohibition of tort actions
Subdivision 1. Wrongful life action prohibited. No person shall maintain
a cause of action or receive an award of damages on behalf of that person
based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, the person
would have been aborted.
Subd. 2. Wrongful birth action prohibited. No person shall maintain a
cause of action or receive an award of damages on the claim that but for the
negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted.
Subd. 3. Failure or refusal to prevent a live birth. Nothing in this section
shall be construed to preclude a cause of action for intentional or negligent
malpractice or any other action arising in tort based on the failure of a con-
traceptive method or sterilization procedure or on a claim that, but for the
negligent conduct of another, tests or treatment would have been provided
or would have been provided properly which would have made possible the
prevention, cure, or amelioration or any disease, defect, deficiency or handi-
cap; provided, however, that abortion shall not have been deemed to pre-
vent, cure, or ameliorate any disease, defect, deficiency, or handicap. The
failure or refusal of any person to perform or have an abortion shall not be a
defense in any action, nor shall that failure or refusal be considered in
awarding damages or in imposing a penalty on any action.
MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (1986).
102. The statute does not preclude postconception negligence actions for failure
to treat a child in utero or affirmatively injuring a fetus. These actions, however, do
not involve the claim that a child would have been aborted and thus, are not postcon-
ception injury of birth actions. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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infant would have been aborted.103 Similarly, the statute bars all
claims of parents alleging that, but for a doctor's negligence, they
would have aborted a child.104 Curiously, the statute does not ex-
pressly prohibit claims for preconception negligence.105 Based on
the legislative history, it appears that the statute was enacted more
out of concern for an anti-abortion sentiment,106 than out of concern
103. MINN. STAT. § 145.424, subd. 1 (1986).
104. Id. subd. 2 (1986).
105. See id. subd. 3 (1986).
106. The bill was initiated by the anti-abortion group, Minnesota Citizens Con-
cerned for Life (MCCL). The testimony of Maurice Rosenbloom at the Senate Sub-
committee Hearings is indicative of the purpose of the MCCL in proposing the
legislation.
Whether we agree on legalized abortion or not, we should recognize the
right of a woman not to have an abortion as well as the right of medical
personnel and institutions not to participate in this procedure. This piece of
legislation would allow a freedom of conscience for all of society. Free to
choose and not to be placed in the position of pushing abortion on demand
for those who are handicapped in some way or less fortunate.
Testimony of Maurice Rosenbloom at Senate Subcommittee on the Judiciary, Senate
File 1461, Feb. 1, 1982 (transcript of tape available at William Mitchell Law Review
office). Further testimony in favor of the bill was provided by Anna Lawler of the
Human Life Alliance of Minnesota (HLAM) stating the purpose of the bill was, "to
establish in the state of Minnesota that 1) being alive is better than not being alive;
and 2) that the choice of medical care and treatment can be based on this premise."
Id.
As the bill moved through both houses it was often apparent that its purpose and
ramifications were unclear to many of the legislators and those offering testimony.
The sponsor of the bill in the House suggested that the bill would not preclude ac-
tions for postconception claims against the health care provider.
We're concerned about the cases where children, where obviously none of
us are born perfect, can bring suit at will against their parents for any imper-
fection. Any child who is born less than perfect with this dictum now being
brought forth can maintain an action against their parents. We don't be-
lieve this is right. The bill doesn't go any further than that, it doesn't preclude any
other types of actions .... This bill doesn't preclude actions for malpractice, for inten-
tional or negligent malpractice. It does not preclude actions for products liability, nor
does it preclude actions which can be brought against doctors for failure of abortions or
for failure of contraceptive devices.
Testimony of Representative O'Connor before House Judiciary Committee, House
File 1532, Feb. 11, 1982 (emphasis added) (transcript of tape available at William
Mitchell Law Review office).
There was confusion over whether or not the bill was an "abortion bill." "The
Abortion Rights Council does not look upon 1461 as an abortion bill, but we do feel
that this bill is an attack on health care for both men and women." Testimony of Kay
Taylor before Senate Judiciary Committee, Senate File 1461, Feb. i1, 1982.
Representative Hokenson: [Ilt appears to me that this is going to be one of
those votes that's some sort of litmus test on the abortion issue. And you
know what - I actually wanted to find out something about this bill. You
know, what it was about and what it could do. If you can't do that and if that
dilutes the subcommittee process - take the vote.
Representative O'Connor: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I per-
sonally don't believe this is a litmus test type bill. I think this is, should be
common ground. All we're saying is we're trying to preclude kids from su-
1988]
23
McAfee: The Injury of Birth: Minnesota's Statutory Prohibition of Postcon
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
about the recovery of tort damages. io7 While the providence of cur-
tailing such actions in light of exploding genetic technologies is
ing their parents and in the future trying to keep any action for, like I said,
less than perfection in a child that's born from coming into court. I don't
view this necessarily as a pro-life or pro-choice bill and that's not my inten-
tions. I am certainly not out here to try to make anybody turn from blue to
pink, I guess, when they're tested.
Id. In sum, both the Senate and House judiciary committee tapes are evidence of a
confused approach to some very complicated issues including delineating between
various claims, interference with procreative decisionmaking, and compensation for
injury in fact. See id.; Subcommittee on the Judiciary, Senate File 1461, Feb. 1, 1982.
107. The skyrocketing awards for damages in injury of birth cases might at first
blush suggest a reform oriented purpose. The fact that only two cases of this type
have reached the Minnesota appellate courts would seem to dispel that notion. Min-
nesota's two postconception negligence cases arose after the statute, although three
preconception cases preceeded it.
Another suggestion of the purpose of the statute is that the legislature "decided
[that] the already perplexing problems of Sherlock would have been compounded and
exacerbated and that a further tort remedy was not warranted." Hickman, 396
N.W.2d at 18 (Simonett, J., concurring). Although the Minnesota legislature gener-
ally does not include purpose sections in statutes, such a suggestion ignores the ef-
fect the bill has of punishing parents who would have chosen to abort their child, but
for the negligent conduct of their health care provider. See Note, supra note 6, at
2017-19. Prevention of abortion was clearly the intent behind the legislation. In fact,
representatives of Minnesota Conference of Catholic Health Facilities, Minnesota
Catholic Conference, Catholic Health Association of the United States, Rutherford
Institute, Americans United for Life, Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights,
and National Right to Life Committee represented their interests in this, the first
constitutional challenge to such a statute. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 10-11.
At both the Senate and House subcommittee hearings, the bill was described as a
response to dicta from Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811,
165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980), which approved of a cause of action by an afflicted child
against its parents for "the pain, suffering and misery which they have wrought upon
their offspring" by not having an abortion. Id. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. 488. See Rob-
ertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Inju-
ries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1457 (suggesting
possibility of child's suit against parents for wrongful life). The effect of this dicta was
quickly mooted, however, by the California legislature, which prohibited a cause of
action by a child against its parents and provided that the failure to have an abortion
could not be a defense in any action.
(a) No cause of action arises against a parent of a child based upon a claim
that the child should not have been conceived or, if conceived, should not
have been allowed to have been born alive.
(b) The failure or refusal of a parent to prevent the live birth of his or her
child shall not be a defense in any action against a third party, nor shall the
failure or refusal be considered in awarding damages in any such action.
(c) As used in this section "conceived" means the fertilization of a human
ovum by a human sperm.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982). This legislation, though much narrower than the
Minnesota statute, was also drafted in response to the Curlender dicta. Turpin, 31
Cal.3d at 229, 643 P.2d at 959, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 342. See Comment, Wrongful Life: A
Legislative Solution to Negligent Genetic Counseling, 18 U.S.F. L. REV. 77, 90 (1983) (dis-
cussing the California statute). See also Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79
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questionable, the statute has also been challenged as a violation of
equal protection and due process.
B. Hickman: The Constitutional Challenge
We are fully aware of the situation that existed a mere quarter of
a century ago when physicians' actions were scarcely ever chal-
lenged and there was very little or any accountability to anyone for
the decisions that they made. Those times have changed. The
pendulum has now swung to the opposite extreme. Simply put,
doctors must be returned some leeway in exercising judgement af-
fecting the treatment of their patients without fear of legal
sanction.
1 0 8
The Minnesota Supreme Court held the legislative prohibition of
postconception injury of birth actions constitutional in Hickman v.
Group Health Plan, Inc.t09 In Hickman, the plaintiff gave birth to a
COLUM. L. REV. 618, 661-66 (1979) (concluding that parental liability to child for
wrongful life is unacceptable).
Thus, Minnesota's wrongful birth statute appears to serve a prophylactic func-
tion by easing the fear that allowing wrongful birth actions will create a legal duty for
health care providers to recommend prenatal tests and nontherapeutic abortions and
encourage parents to abort children more often in fear of suits brought against them
by their affected children. See Note, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: Analysis of the
Causes of Action and the Impact of Utah's Statutory Breakwater, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 833,
857-58.
108. Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn. 1986). Jus-
tice Yetka's comment seems to disregard the fact that genetic counseling is in its
infancy, as are tort actions arising from its negligent execution. See supra note 8. The
comment may also be criticized because "returning leeway" to health care providers
in exercising judgement affecting procreative choice involves issues of constitutional
dimension. See infra notes 114-51. Thus, in Minnesota's genetic counseling arena,
physicians are in a position similar to what they were in a quarter of a century ago for
traditional medical treatments, and their patients are, again, mostly in the dark.
The Hickman decision, with three justices concurring and three dissenting, has
been met with criticism as Minnesota clings to its statutory prohibition on postcon-
ception injury of birth actions involving claims that, but for the health care provider's
negligence, the fetus would have been aborted. The Hickman case represents the first
hearing of the constitutionality of the statutes, which have been introduced in 21
states at the urging of anti-abortion groups. See Note, supra note 6, at 2018-19. Two
cases have been heard in states with wrongful birth statutes based on claims that
arose prior to the effective dates of the statutes. See Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d
741 (1988); Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987). The Utah court denied the
parent's and child's preconception injury of birth actions based on a state employee
immunity statute. Payne, 743 P.2d at 190. The Missouri court judicially denied both
the parent's and child's actions in a postconception case, without considering the
constitutionality of the statute. Wilson at 751 S.W.2d at 745. See also Rolf v. Young-
blood, - S.W.2d - (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (following the decision in Wilson). Thus in
Missouri, postconception injury of birth actions are precluded both legislatively and
judicially.
109. 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986).
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child with Down's Syndrome. Because of her age, 10 the chances of
bearing an abnormal child were significantly increased. I I Although
the facts were disputed, the claim was that but for the doctor's negli-
gence in failing to offer or advise amniocentesis, the child would
have been aborted.' 1 2 Upon cross motions for partial summary
judgment, the district court struck down the statute as unconstitu-
tional and certified the case for immediate appeal to the Minnesota
Supreme Court.' 13
1. State Action
State interference with the abortion decision is a prerequisite to
finding a violation of the fourteenth amendment. The Hickman court
held that the statute did not violate the due process and equal pro-
tection provisions of the fourteenth amendment because there was
no state action or involvement. 114 Relying on Blum v. Yaretsky, 15 the
110. At the time the plaintiff became pregnant, she was 34 years of age. Id. at 11.
11. The risk of Down's Syndrome increases with maternal age. Id. See also infra
note 170.
112. 396 N.W.2d at 11-12.
113. Id. at 11.
114. Id. at 13.
115. 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (due process does not require that the state adopt regu-
lations prohibiting purely private conduct). Blum may be distinguished because the
Hickman statute affirmatively shields private actors from liability for interference with
a fundamental right, rather than involving mere legislative refusal to prohibit the
private conduct. In Blum, the Court required that the state be responsible for "the
specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains" for state action to exist. Id. at 1004.
In Blum the specific conduct by the staff was based on their medical judgment, not the
state regulations identifying conditions meriting the various levels of nursing care.
Id. at 1008. Blum cannot be read as involving regulations designed to immunize de-
fendants for their negligent medical judgements. In injury of birth cases, the specific
conduct complained of is based on a health care provider's negligent or intentional
medical judgement that interferes with reproductive decisionmaking, which may or
may not be a result of the statute prohibiting such actions. Thus, these are not cases
"in which the states have merely abstained from action, leaving private individuals
free to impose such discriminations as they see fit." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,
19 (1948) (state action met by court grant of injunction enforcing racially restrictive
covenants). Cf. Barrows v.Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254-56 (1953) (state action met by
court grant of money damages to plaintiffs).
Further, the action of the state courts themselves in denying injury of birth suits
may be state action. The Shelly court held that judicial enforcement of a racially re-
strictive covenant would constitute state action. "[B]ut for the active intervention of
the state courts, supported by the full panopoly of state power, [the defendants]
would have been free to occupy the properties in question .. " Shelly, 334 U.S. at
19. While the plaintiff in an injury of birth case could never retrieve the lost right
even in the absence ofjudicial intervention, the state has prevented her from recoup-
ing damages which, in an abstract sense, equal that right. So as a court may not
award money damages that effectively enforce racially restrictive covenants, neither
should they refuse to award damages intended to make whole those whose rights
have been infringed upon. Cf. Barrows, 346 U.S. at 255-56.
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court found no infringement by the state that "directly touch[ed] on
the expectant mother's right to choose an abortion."' 16 This is be-
cause the obstacle placed in the path of the woman's ability to make
an informed abortion decision is placed there by the doctor's negli-
gence, not the state's prohibition of postconception injury of birth
actions.'1 7 The relationship is strictly between the doctor and the
patient. The statute does not forbid the doctor from informing the
patient of prenatal tests or risks of pregnancy." 18
Griswold v. Connecticut established that a person's decision to use
contraceptives is constitutionally protected.1 9 Roe v. Wade extended
this protection to a woman's abortion decision.120 These cases es-
tablish the fundamental legal right of persons to make decisions re-
garding childbearing. Since the state cannot infringe on such rights,
it follows that the state cannot completely denigrate the right by de-
nying protection provided to similar rights.121 If fundamental rights
are to be protected, the state must allow actions to be brought when
there has been interference with such rights.12 2 For the state to al-
low a person, through negligent conduct, to frustrate the realization
of a married couple's desire to limit the size of their family or a wo-
man's desire to choose abortion denigrates the right itself.123 Thus,
the removal of the deterrent effect of a lawsuit is state action.124
116. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 13.
117. Id. at 17 (Simonett, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 13.
119. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
121. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 253-54, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971).
122. The primary reason for the almost universal acceptance of injury of birth
actions since the early 1970's may be attributed to the decision in Roe. Several courts
have noted Roe's significance in this context. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658
F.2d 471, 475-76 (7th Cir. 1981); Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 550
(D.S.C. 1981); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 431-32, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (1979); Ziemba
v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 232-33, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (1973).
123. Justice Candena, dissenting from the majority decision in Terrell, stated:
It is, therefore, impermissible to say that social policy requires that a hus-
band and wife be denied the right to limit the number of children which they
will bring into the world, or that a person shall be allowed, by his negligent
conduct, to frustrate the realization of the married couple's aim to limit the
size of their family.
Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
927 (1974).
124. Two surveys show that the threat of malpractice liability causes obstetricians
and gynecologists to modify their behavior to reduce the risk of injuries to their pa-
tients. See Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts
About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 966-70 (1984) (citing
PORTER, NOVELLI & Assoc., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE AND ITS EFFECTS: RE-
PORT OF A SURVEY OF ACOG's MEMBERSHIP (Aug. 31, 1983) [hereinafter ACOG SUR-
VEY]; P.M. HARTNETT, AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF WRONGFUL BIRTH AND
WRONGFUL LIFE ON THE OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS IN NEW YORK (Jan.
1988]
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The Minnesota statute also possesses characteristics forbidden by
the equal protection clause.125 Because only women can give birth,
the statute discriminates against them precisely because they are wo-
men. The statute allows actions brought by men and women based
on claims that negligent or intentional conduct caused them to con-
ceive an unwanted child, while prohibiting only the claims of women
that negligent conduct induced them to give birth, rather than have
an abortion.126 That such a classification was drawn by the Minne-
sota statute suffices for state action.127
2. Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
Even though the plurality in Hickman found no state action, they
went on to analyze the case for a possible violation of the fourteenth
amendment. 128 Once a finding has been made that the state has in-
terfered with the fundamental right protected by Roe, it must be de-
termined whether or not a compelling state interest for interference
exists.129 Neither the interest in protecting the health of the woman,
nor the interest in protecting the potential for human life is sufficient
prior to the third trimester of pregnancy.So Thus, the statute
1984) [hereinafter HARTNETr SURVEY]). Over 70% of the physicians in both the
ACOG SURVEY and the HARTNE'rr SURVEY indicated that they had increased the use of
amniocentesis in women at risk due to the rising number of malpractice suits. See
Bell, supra at 967. The use of amniocentesis and ultrasound was also substantially
increased in all pregnancies. Id. at 968. The studies also pointed out less formal
evidence of the deterrent effect of liability including: higher premiums; increased use
of lab tests, X-rays and consultations; decreased amount of high risk obstetric care
offered; refusal to practice obstetrics at all; relocation due to high premiums; and
increased lobbying. Id. at 968-69. See generally Capron, supra note 107, at 666-71
(discussing increased use of defensive medicine in genetic counseling and its effect in
health care).
125. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTrlONAL LAw 1698-1700 (2d ed. 1988).
126. Men and children of both sexes who suffer pecuniary loss are also precluded
from postconception negligence suits involving claims that but for a physician's neg-
ligence, a child would have been aborted. Neither the child nor, less obviously, the
man has absolute veto power over a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.
See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-72 (1976). Since their actions
for pecuniary loss are uniquely dependent on the woman's fundamental right, men
and children are not considered in the excluded class for equal protection analysis.
See supra note 122 (Roe was a primary factor in allowing postconception injury of birth
lawsuits); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (although precluding women from
disability benefits would also affect men's and children's pecuniary interests, they
were excluded from the class for equal protection analysis).
127. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (state action was not even an issue in a
challenge to a statute which treated pregnant women differently than other claimants
under state disability program).
128. Thus, it might be argued that much of the Hickman plurality opinion should
be treated as non-binding dicta, with the exception of the state action analysis.
129. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 19 (Amdahl, C.J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 19-20 (Amdahl, C.J., dissenting); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
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should be found unconstitutional as it relates to negligence prior to
the third trimester of pregnancy.' 3 1
The statute was also challenged as a violation of equal protection,
because preconception injury of birth actions are allowed in Minne-
sota, while postconception injury of birth actions are prohibited. Roe
makes it clear that the Supreme Court views abortion as a method of
birth control. 132 A statute which allowed the practice of preconcep-
tion methods of birth control (sterilization, contraception), but not
postconception methods (abortion) should fail constitutional scru-
tiny under Roe. Wrongful birth statutes preclude causes of action on
this very same basis. Only women who give birth due to postconcep-
tion negligence that prevented them from terminating a pregnancy
are barred from suit.
Middle level scrutinty has been applied to classifications made by
government based on gender.13 3 These classifications "must serve
important government objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives."134 Two Supreme Court cases,
Geduldig v. Aiello 135 and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,136 involved disa-
bility programs that classified men and women in a fashion similar to
the wrongful birth statutes. In Geduldig, a California statute excluded
pregnancy from coverage under a state disability insurance program.
The Supreme Court found that the program divided potential recipi-
ents of insurance benefits into two groups: "pregnant women and
nonpregnant persons."S7 Admitting that the denied group was ex-
clusively female, the Court reasoned that because both men and wo-
men benefitted equally when the condition of pregnancy was
excluded,' 38 the program did not violate equal protection. The
Geduldig opinion has been met with criticism for not applying middle
level scrutiny to a gender-based classification' 3 9 in order to reach an
131. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 20 (Amdahl, C.J., dissenting).
132. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64.
133. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976). The Supreme Court first invali-
dated gender discrimination under the traditional "rational relationship" test. Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). Shortly after Reed, the Court redefined the standard
in gender discrimination cases as one of strict scrutiny. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (plurality opinion). The Court seems to have settled on middle
level scrutiny since Craig. See Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
134. Craig, 429 U.S. at 204.
135. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
136. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
137. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
138. Even this was not as clear as the Court made it appear. Men were allowed to
receive benefits for other sex-specific kinds of disability such as prostectomy and cir-
cumcision. Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. "Did the Court mean to suggest that anyone who becomes pregnant, whether
male or female, is equally ineligible?" TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTritrioNAL LAw 1071
1988]
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arguably defensible result.140 The Geduldig reasoning was followed,
however, by the Court in Gilbert when a group of women challenged
a similar private disability program under Title VII. 14 1 The Gilbert
Court recognized that only women become pregnant, but because
pregnancy is "often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition"
it differed significantly from the other disabilities covered.'4 2
The pregnancies involved in postconception injury of birth claims
are neither voluntary nor desired. These pregnancies continue only
as a result of failed abortion procedures, misdiagnosed pregnancies,
or negligence that induces the woman to carry a child with anomalies
to term. Although wrongful birth statutes classify men and women
similarly to the Geduldig and Gilbert disability programs, they do not
involve the exclusion of women from benefits received from either
the state or an employer. Rather, wrongful birth statutes exclude
women from their common law right to redress in a tort action
against a tortfeasor. Thus, even though the classifications are
similiarly drawn, the criticism of Geduldig, the fact that Gilbert was ef-
fectively overruled by Congress,143 and the important differences be-
tween wrongful birth statutes and disability programs compel a
different result.
While the continuing validity of Geduldig is suspect, 144 the fact that
n.5 (1978) (emphasis in original). Professor Tribe also noted the similarity of preg-
nancy classifications to burdens placed on women by government restrictions on
abortion. Id. at 1071 n.6. See also LOCKHART, KAMISAR AND CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw- CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 1410 n.a (5th ed. 1980) (suggesting that a disa-
bility program excluding only sickle cell anemia or a statute forbidding blacks from
unaccredited law schools from becoming lawyers might also survive if the Geduldig
reasoning was followed); Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences into Account, 54
FORDHAM LJ. 699, 741 (1986) (tautological reasoning of Geduldig rests on Court's
inability to conceptualize discrimination based on sex differences); Law, Rethinking
Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 983-85 (1984) (listing "cottage indus-
try" of Geduldig criticism, including over two dozen law review articles and suggesting
that discrimination against pregnant women is as sex-based as creating obstacles to
abortion).
140. California's disability program, which largely benefited workers who did not
have insurance and were not covered by workers compensation, would certainly have
been bankrupt under its original scheme if pregnancy was included as a disability. See
Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 492-96. This is not to say that the program could not have been
restructured to allow benefits to pregnant women. Id. at 504 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
141. 429 U.S. at 127-28.
142. Id. at 136.
143. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978). See California
Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 692 (1987) (Congress intended
PDA to end discrimination against pregnant women).
144. See City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
725 (1978) (Blackmun,J., concurring).
[T]oday's decision cuts back on General Electric and inferentially on Geduldig,
the reasoning of which was adopted there, and, indeed, makes the recogni-
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it stands alone as equal protection analysis, and apart from the line
of Title VII decisions,' 45 makes it important in analyzing the wrong-
ful birth statutes. Even without applying middle level scrutiny,
Geduldig left open the possibility that a statute would violate equal
protection if the "distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts
designed to effect an invidious discrimination against members of
one sex or the other." 146 The aim of the wrongful birth statutes is to
discriminate against those causes of action that necessarily involve
the claim that a child would have been aborted. Since that claim is
inextricably linked to a woman's decision to terminate her preg-
nancy, the statutes discriminate against women.
The Hickman majority rejected the equal protection argument
without considering Geduldig. The court suggested that precluding
claims for preconception negligence would remedy the problem of
unequal treatment. 47 The concurring opinion tried to distinguish
wrongful birth from wrongful conception plaintiffs based on the in-
tion of those cases as continuing precedent somewhat questionable. I do
not say that this is necessarily bad. I feel, however, that we should meet the
posture of the earlier cases head on and not by thin rationalization that
seeks to distinguish but fails in its quest."
Id. See also Law, supra note 139, at 984 n.l 10 (Geduldig limited to questions of insur-
ance by Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44, 45 (1975)).
145. There was some question as to whether the Geduldig equal protection analy-
sis, as followed in Gilbert, should apply to Title VII cases.
The dissenters in Gilbert took issue with the majority's assumption 'that the
Fourteenth Amendment standard of discrimination is coterminous with that
applicable to Title VII.' As a matter of statutory interpretation, the dissent-
ers rejected the Court's holding that the plan's exclusion of disabilities
caused by pregnancy did not constitute discrimination based on sex ....
[Tihe appropriate classification was 'between persons who face a risk of
pregnancy and those who do not.'
When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambiguously ex-
pressed its disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court
in the Gilbert decision.
Newport News Shipbuilder and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 677-78 (1983).
Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opinion in Gilbert, disagreed with the result
and the reasoning of Newport. "For a different result to obtain, Gilbert would have to
be judicially overruled by this Court or Congress would have to legislatively overrule
our decision in its entirety by amending Title VII. Today the Court purports to find
the latter by relying on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Id. at 686. (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
146. 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
147. See Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 15.
[I]f the plaintiff has the right to invoke equal protection, does it follow that,
if a statute has three sections, two of which specifically deny a cause of action
and the third merely codifies the existence of an earlier decision of this court
made prior to the express will of the legislature, this court must hold the two
sections invalid on the basis of section three? We think not. The legislative
intent is clear and if any section of the statute is open to question, it would
most likely be section three rather than the previous two sections.
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terests sought to be compensated,148 an analysis that breaks down
both in negligent inducement of conception cases 149 and postcon-
ception negligence cases involving misdiagnosed pregnancies or
failed abortion procedures.150 The opinion of the court, like the
Minnesota legislature, evidenced a reluctance to accept that a wo-
man's choice to not have a child is the same whether made before or
after conception. 151
VI. REMAINING LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 145.424
The Minnesota statute precludes nearly all liability for postconcep-
tion negligence. Postconception negligence will be actionable only
in the rare situation where prenatal treatment of some kind was avail-
able. Negligent nondisclosure appears to offer little escape from the
statute's prohibition. It should be noted, however, that the statutory
language applies to a doctor's negligent conduct only; thus, a woman's
postconception injury of birth action, and a child's, would not be
precluded if a health care provider intentionally withheld information
crucial to a reproductive decision. In addition, all claims for precon-
ception negligence appear to be actionable.
A. Preconception Negligence
The statute does not preclude actions based on a failure of a con-
traceptive method or a sterilization procedure.152 The Hickman
court suggested, however, that the reasoning, and perhaps the deci-
sion, of Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic153 might be erroneous in light of
148. Id. at 17 (SimonettJ., concurring).
149. See infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
150. See infra notes 165-76 and accompanying text. For a different view of why
wrongful birth statutes deny equal protection of the law, see Note, supra note 6, at
2027-034.
151. Cf. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 776 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (the decision on child-bearing is no
less important the day after conception than the day before); Gallagher v. Duke
Univ., 638 F. Supp. 979, 982-83 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (allowing action for preconception
negligence that induced a couple to conceive a child even in a state which bars suits
for postconception negligence).
152. MINN. STAT. § 145.424, subd. 3 (1986). Thus, actions for preconception neg-
ligence are still permissible under the statute. Accord Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977). The Hickman court noted that the legislature did not
"create" a wrongful conception cause of action, but rather "simply recognized the
existing common law under Sherlock." Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 17 (Simonett, J., con-
curring). It might be argued, however, that the legislation creates a cause of action
based on the failure of a contraceptive device, as no Minnesota case has addressed
the issue. See MINN. STAT. § 145.424, subd. 3 (1986).
153. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977). The Minnesota Supreme Court has been
cited for its well-reasoned approach to preconception negligence in the Sherlock case,
[Vol. 14
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the legislative intent expressed in the wrongful birth statute.154 The
likelihood that Sherlock would be overruled is remote in light of the
fact that a preconception negligence claim arises from negligence
that induces conception and, thus, would not seem to interfere with the
state's goal of favoring child birth over abortion.155 Further, the stat-
ute itself codifies the common law under Sherlock.156
An action for negligent counseling is possible if the negligence oc-
curred prior to conception. If, for example, a doctor negligently
failed to diagnose an autosomal dominant carrier who later had a
child born with a disorder, liability would be appropriate for the ex-
traordinary medical expenses of the child. The preconception claim
would be a hybrid of the wrongful birth and wrongful conception
claims.
In both cases, the plaintiff would not have had the child but for the
negligence of the doctor, but the interests sought to be compen-
sated are different. In [wrongful conception] there is the right not
to conceive; in [wrongful birth] there is the right not to give birth.
In [wrongful conception] it is the right not to have an unplanned
child, while in [wrongful birth] it is the right not to have an un-
wanted child. In [wrongful conception] there is no hypothetical ex-
ercise of choice of treatment, while in [wrongful birth] there is. 15 7
The parents' claim is that but for the physician's preconception neg-
decided just ten years ago. See D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 372 n.54 (5th ed. 1984).
154. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 14 n.5, 15.
155. See MINN. STAT. § 256B.0 11 (1986). The statute, while referring specifically
to abortion funding, is evidence of the state's policy regarding abortion:
Between normal childbirth and abortion it is the policy of the state of Min-
nesota that normal childbirth is to be given preference, encouragement and
support by law and by state action, it being in the best interests of the well
being and common good of Minnesota citizens.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Brief for Intervenor State of Minnesota at 13-14, Hick-
man v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986) (No. C2-95-2013). The
birth of an affected infant is usually no different than the birth of a healthy child. See
supra note 61.
One commentator believed that legislation overturning the Sherlock decision
would be unconstitutional.
Legislation immunizing physicians from civil liability for the consequences
of their negligence in performing sterilizations appears to be as constitu-
tionally objectionable as is legislation prohibiting the procedure altogether.
Legislation that draws a distinction between the types of medical malprac-
tice for which a remedy would be provided also may be unconstitutional as a
denial of equal protection. The Sherlock court's suggestion that legislation
could be drafted to immunize physicians from liability in the wrongful con-
ception context therefore can be discounted because such legislation proba-
bly would be unconstitutional.
Comment, Wrongful Conception, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 464, 473 (1979).
156. See MINN. STAT. § 145.424, subd. 3 (1986).
157. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 17 (Simonett, J., concurring) (discussing the differ-
ences between wrongful birth and wrongful conception).
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ligence, the child would not have been conceived, which fits the
wrongful conception cause of action.158 However, the claim also in-
volves a planned, but unwanted child, which fits the wrongful birth
model.159 Finally, the claim would not involve an exercise of choice
of treatment, unless the decision not to bear children is considered
such a choice, again following the wrongful conception model. 160
There have been several cases that fit the hypothetical tort that have
been decided as wrongful birth cases.' 6 '
If the parents' action for preconception negligence exists, it fol-
lows that the child's corresponding action may lie as well.162 This
158. Id. at 11-12. Theoretically, it would be irrelevant whether or not the parents
would have chosen to abort the child, as their claim rests on preconception negli-
gence, rather than on postconception negligence. Further, the fact that the parents
knew the child was affected in time to abort it could not be used to mitigate damages
due to public policy favoring childbirth over abortion. See supra note 155 and accom-
panying text; see also Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 708-09, 127 Cal. Rptr.
652, 658 (1976); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 259-60, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519
(1971).
159. There are also wrongful conception cases involving children with congenital
defects. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 53.
160. This would seem unlikely in that the plaintiffs in other preconception negli-
gence cases make a similar "choice" not to bear children by their decision to be
sterilized or use other birth control methods. The parents in the hypothetical pre-
conception case were simply denied the opportunity to make an informed decision
regarding conception.
161. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 638 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (multi-
ple genetic defects); Gildner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (Tay Sachs); Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337 (1982) (hereditary hearing defect); Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,
106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980) (Tay Sachs); Continental Casualty
Co. v. Empire Casualty Co., 713 P.2d 384 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (erythroblastosis
fetalis); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (Larsen's syn-
drome); Goldberg v. Ruskin, 128 Il1. App. 3d 1029, 471 N.E.2d 530 (1984) (Tay
Sachs), aft'd, 113 I11. 2d 482, 499 N.E.2d 406 (1986); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 239
Kan. 245, 718 P.2d 635 (multiple genetic defects); Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53,
432 A.2d 834 (1981) (cystic fibrosis); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d
110 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (polycystic kidney disease), modified, Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Rubin v. Hamot Medical
Cent., 329 Pa. Super. 439, 478 A.2d 869 (1984) (neurofibromatosis); Nelson v.
Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984) (neuromuscular disease); Naccash v. Burger,
223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982) (Tay Sachs); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98
Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (fetal hydantoin syndrome). In these cases, the
injury arose at the time of conception, because had the parents known of the conse-
quences of pregnancy, they would not have conceived. The fact that the parents
could have prevented birth at a later time had they known of the child's affliction is
indistinguishable from the "no duty to mitigate" by abortion rule in a steriliza-
tion/contraceptive claim involving a healthy child. In effect, the parents' claim is for
wrongful conception, though these courts refer to it as wrongful birth. Literally, the
claim is for preconception negligence, "for it is at the point of conception that the
injury claimed by the parents originates." Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 175.
162. The district court in Hickman denied the postconception negligence claim of
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action would seek to recover damages not available in the parent's
cause of action, such as the child's pain and suffering and loss of
earnings.' 63 Additionally, a cause of action may lie for the child to
sue its parents for negligently conceiving. It is ironic that such a
claim remains possible after legislation has been passed that was at
least in part a response to fears that dicta from Curlender v. Bio-Science
Laboratories 164 would lead to more abortions as a result of parents
fearing suit from their offspring.
B. Postconception Negligence
Minnesota's wrongful birth statute might be read to preclude post-
conception negligence actions involving failed abortion proce-
dures16 5 or misdiagnosed pregnancies.166 In the first situation, a
Jessica Hickman, upholding MINN. STAT. § 145.424, subd. 1 (1986) as constitutional.
The constitutionality of that section was not challenged on appeal. See Hickman, 396
N.W.2d at 12 n.2. Because preconception negligence would involve a claim that but
for the negligence of the health care provider the plaintiff child would not have been conceived, the
action is not barred by the Minnesota statute. The statute only precludes claims that
"but for the negligent conduct of another the person would have been aborted." MINN. STAT.
§ 145.424, subd. 1 (1986) (emphasis added). It is the position of this Note that the
Minnesota Legislature or appellate courts will not soon recognize a child's cause of
action for negligence that induced its parents to conceive. The indifference of the
statute toward children's preconception claims, however, again reveals its goal of
preventing claims based on negligently interfered with abortions. This inconsis-
tency, as well as the inconsistency of allowing claims for negligence involving sterili-
zation or contraceptives, but precluding those for negligence involving the diagnosis
of pregnancies or the performance of abortions, illuminates the anti-abortion charac-
ter of the statute and its real purpose of discouraging the abortion decision.
163. The Minnesota Supreme Court may find sufficient reason to dismiss such a
cause of action by the fact that only four jurisdictions have recognized children's
injury of birth actions. See infra note 218 and accompanying text. It is the position of
this Note that a child's injury of birth claim should be recognized. Other commenta-
tors have also taken this position. See, e.g., Capron, Informed Decisionmaking in Genetic
Counseling: A Dissent to the 'Wrongful Life' Debate, 48 IND. L.J. 581, 603-04 (1973);
Capron, supra note 107, at 647-60; Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: M'edical
Alalpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C. L. REv. 713, 756-57 (1982);
Note, supra note 6, at 2034; Note, supra note 2, at 1500-02; Note, supra note 107, at
848-49; Note, A Cause of Action for 'Wrongful Life', 55 MINN. L. REV. 58, 80-81 (1970);
Comment, supra note 107, at 91-97.
164. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980). The Curlender
dicta was quickly and effectively mooted by the California Legislature. See supra note
107. The Minnesota Legislature, concerned that such an action could exist, did not
eliminate it entirely.
165. Postconception injury of birth actions have been brought as the result of
failed abortion procedures. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1976); Ladies Cent. of Clearwater, Inc. v. Reno, 341 So. 2d 543 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 11. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979);
Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984);Jean-Charles v. Planned Parenthood
Ass'n of Mohawk Valley, Inc., 99 AD.2d 542, 471 N.Y.S.2d 622 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984); Mears v. Alhadeff, 88 A.D.2d 827, 451 N.Y.S.2d 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982);
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woman who makes a choice to terminate her pregnancy goes to a
doctor willing to perform an abortion. The doctor performs the
abortion procedure negligently, and the woman gives birth to an un-
wanted child.167 The second situation involves a doctor who negli-
gently misdiagnoses a pregnancy that prevents the woman from
seeking an abortion within the lawful time period. The plain lan-
guage of subdivision 2 precludes a cause of action or damages on the
claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child would
have been aborted.168
In the past, these types of actions may have been governed by the
Sherlock decision, which clearly allows recovery of the costs of rearing
Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979); Miller v. Johnson, 231
Va. 177, 343 S.E.2d 301 (1986).
166. For examples of postconception injury of birth actions involving misdiag-
nosed pregnancies, see, e.g., Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47, 300 N.W.2d 727
(1980); Comras v. Lewin, 183 N.J. Super. 42, 443 A.2d 229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1982); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974);
Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974). Part of the
reason for the acceptance of such actions is that the risk to the woman from an abor-
tion increases as her pregnancy continues. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113. 149-50
(1973).
167. In Minnesota, the victim of medical malpractice is not required to mitigate
damages by seeking a second treatment to remedy the first doctor's negligence. See
Martineau v. Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 102-03, 247 N.W.2d 409, 415-16 (1976). Simi-
larly, the Minnesota wrongful birth statute provides that "the failure or refusal of any
person to . . . have an abortion shall not be a defense in any action." MINN. STAT.
§ 145.424, subd. 3 (1986). Thus, even if the woman, after an abortion was negli-
gently performed, decided she wanted the unexpected child during a time when a
legal abortion was still possible, she could still state a claim for postconception negli-
gence damages in the absence of a wrongful birth statute.
168. MINN. STAT. § 145.424, subd. 2 (1986). Because of the preclusion of a cause
of action, it is possible that even recovery of damages for the pain and suffering asso-
ciated with the unwanted childbirth, costs of hospitalization, loss of earnings and loss
of consortium would be precluded in these actions. Abortion is not considered a
contraception method, since it does not prevent fertilization of the ovum. Thus, the
language of subdivision 3, which saves a cause of action "arising in tort based on the
failure of a contraceptive method" would not allow these types of actions. Id.
§ 145.424, subd. 3. Abortion, while not acceptable as a method of routine birth con-
trol, should be considered a birth control method because it is the last alternative
when other birth control methods fail. See Holt, supra note 29, at 759 n. 1. Minnesota
courts are put in the awkward position of allowing actions resulting from the failure
of some forms of birth control (i.e., failed sterilization procedures and contraception
methods), but not others (failed abortion procedures and misdiagnosis preventing
abortions). This inconsistency may reflect outdated beliefs of the Minnesota Legisla-
ture. But see supra note 106 (testimony of Representative O'Connor that bill would
not preclude these actions).
A better approach in these situations would be to allow damages for the pain and
suffering associated with the unwanted pregnancy, loss of earnings, hospital costs
and loss of consortium, while denying damages for the costs of rearing the unwanted,
but healthy child to the age of majority. The best approach would be to allow all
damages reasonably flowing from the defendant's tortious act, as in Sherlock.
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a child born due to negligence involving a birth control method.
These claims and the cost of rearing damages could not be pre-'
cluded without facing strong constitutional challenges.169 Thus, the
distinction between negligence in failing to suggest an abortion and
negligence in performing an abortion or failing to diagnose a preg-
nancy in time for the patient to obtain a legal abortion remains im-
portant in Minnesota.
Postconception negligent counseling and diagnosis is unaction-
able under the statute if the counseling and diagnosis could only pre-
vent the damage by allowing the parents to choose abortion. 170 The
169. A constitutional challenge to the preclusion of actions involving misdiag-
nosed pregnancies or negligently performed abortions may provide a stronger argu-
ment than the Hickman wrongful birth challenge. The language of the statute
precludes such claims as "wrongful birth" causes of action because they necessarily
involve the assertion that a child would have been aborted. These are not "wrongful
birth" claims, according to popular definition. See supra notes 53-56 and accompany-
ing text. The Minnesota Supreme Court calls failed sterilization actions "wrongful
conception" actions, but has yet to hear a case involving a misdiagnosed pregnancy
or failed abortion procedure.
Assuming that the state action requirement could be met, the possibility of the
statute surviving an equal protection challenge on this basis is doubtful. The concur-
rence in Hickman found, in effect, that failed sterilization plaintiffs and plaintiffs who
were induced to carry an affected child to term were not similarly situated, given the
differences between the interests served by the two actions. See Hickman, 396 N.W.2d
at 15-18. The statute shows its discriminatory effect more clearly when preconcep-
tion negligence claims involving failed sterilization procedures or the failure of cer-
tain contraceptive methods are compared with postconception negligence claims
involving negligent abortions or misdiagnosed pregnancies. The interests sought to
be compensated by the claims are identical: to compensate the mother of an un-
wanted child born due to a health care provider's negligence. The Minnesota statute
favors women and men whose claims are based on the failure of preconception birth
control methods over women who give birth to children as the result of misdiagnosed
pregnancies or failed abortions (postconception birth control).
170. The claim would be that the physician's negligence induced the woman to
carry an affected child to term, rather than seeking an abortion. These postconcep-
tion claims usually arise when a woman has an illness or is of advanced age. For
example, a woman who contracts german measles (rubella) in the first three months
of pregnancy risks bearing a child with defects. See THE MosBY MEDICAL ENCYCLOPE-
DIA 650 (1985). In addition to the birth defects, the child may carry the virus for up
to 30 months after birth. See id.; see also supra note 2 (discussion of rubella-related
syndrome). Advanced maternal age may lead to birth defects, the most prevalent
being Down's Syndrome. Down's Syndrome occurs in approximately 1 in 600 live
births. See THE MOSBY MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 237. The incidence may be as high as
I in 80 for women over 40. See id. For a discussion of Down's Syndrome defects, see
supra note 2.
Many courts have heard postconception injury of birth claims based on negligent
diagnosis and counseling which prevented a woman from terminating the pregnancy
of an affected fetus. For examples of these cases, see, e.g., Scales v. United States,
685 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1982) (rubella-related syndrome); Robak v. United States, 658
F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1981) (rubella-related syndrome); Phillips v. United States, 508 F.
Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981) (Down's Syndrome); Andalon v. Superior Court (Plowman),
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statute, however, leaves open the possibility of a cause of action that:
but for the negligent conduct of another, tests or treatment would
have been provided or would have been provided properly which
would have made possible the prevention, cure, or amelioration of
any disease, defect, deficiency, or handicap; provided, however,
that abortion shall not have been deemed to prevent, cure, or ame-
liorate any disease, defect, deficiency, or handicap.171
Unfortunately, the only "treatment" for many of the afflictions post-
conception negligence actions seek to compensate is abortion.172
There are very few conditions that medicine can prevent, cure, or
ameliorate prenatally.1 73 Thus, at least for the present, the statute
offers a very small concession in return for the outright preclusion of
postconception injury of birth actions.
Assuming that a condition existed that could be treated prenatally,
would the failure of a health care provider to suggest amniocentesis
in appropriate circumstances result in liability? If the failure to sug-
162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984) (Down's Syndrome); Haymon v.
Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987) (Down's Syndrome); DiNatale v. Lieberman,
409 So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315
(1985) (rubella-related syndrome); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d
230, 512 N.E.2d 691 (1987) (hemophilia); Proffitt v. Bartolo, 162 Mich. App. 35, 412
N.W.2d 232 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (rubella-related syndrome); Smith v. Cote, 128
N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341 (1986) (rubella-related syndrome); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 NJ.
339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984) (rubella-related syndrome); Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421,
404 A.2d 8 (1979) (Down's Syndrome); Bani-Esraili v. Lerman, 69 N.Y.2d 807, 505
N.E.2d 947, 513 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1987) (Thalassemia major); Alquijay v. St. Luke's-
Roosevelt Hosp. Cent., 63 N.Y.2d 978, 473 N.E.2d 244, 483 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1984)
(Down's Syndrome);Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (rubella-related
syndrome); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985) (Down's Syndrome);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (rubella-re-
lated syndrome).
171. MINN. STAT. § 145.424, subd. 3 (1986).
172. See Note, supra note 2, at 1497.
173. Scientific and technological advances may change this result. See Phillips, 508
F. Supp. at 543. The Phillips court hypothesized of:
a technological breakthrough in genetic engineering, focusing perhaps on
the transduction or transformation of chromosomal material through re-
combinant DNA ("gene-splicing") techniques, controlled mutagenesis, or
microsurgery, or in euphrenics, which would allow a particular genetic de-
fect to be treated in utero during the early stages of pregnancy.
Id. at 543 n.12 (citing M. STRICKBERGER, GENETICS 822 (1968); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)). The Phillips court felt these advances would
cause a child's action for postconception negligence to be viewed more like torts en
ventre sa mere, thus making them more like the DES cases involving drug-induced car-
cinoma. Phillips, 508 F. Supp. at 543-44 n.12. One situation where the failure to
diagnose a woman's condition prenatally may prevent treatment in utero involves a
pregnant woman who, as a child, had PKU. "The mother can prevent harm to her
baby by returning to the admittedly unpleasant diet that prevented her from being
retarded." Robertson & Shulman, supra note 11, at 23-33. The diet is expensive and
offensive to the taste and smell. See Note, supra note 2, at 1496-97 n.35.
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gest prenatal diagnosis prevented the parents from pursuing fetal
treatment, an action would appear to lie for the parents and the
child.174 This result might lead the court to accept the value of a
chance doctrine, 175 with recovery based on the percentage chance of
the foregone treatment being successful.176
C. Informed Consent
To say that the Doctors had a duty to disclose something more
would, in effect, require them to inform the [patient] that their di-
agnosis might be incorrect. There is no logical stopping point to
such a requirement. Such a rule could conceivably force physicians
to inform patients of all risks associated with all conditions that
were not diagnosed. To require physicians to list such a parade of
horribles under those circumstances is not countenanced under
either law or policy.'
77
174. Since the claim would not involve abortion, it might best lie in the child for
pain and suffering, loss of earnings and extraordinary medical expenses. But see
Andalon v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984) (no
damages for loss of earnings in wrongful life action). However, since the parents are
required to raise the child to the age of majority, they might also have a claim for
extraordinary medical expenses.
175. The value of a chance doctrine is derived from section 323 of the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS which provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his under-
taking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
The value of a chance doctrine has been accepted in the majority ofjurisdictions
that have considered the issue. See Bradt & Guthmann, Recovery for the Value of a
Chance in Medical Negligence Cases: Bringing Minnesota's Standard of Causation Up to Date,
12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 459, 494-504 (1986). The value of a chance doctrine has
been mentioned, but not followed, in the Minnesota appellate courts. See Cornfeldt
v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 641 n.4 (Minn. 1980); Kalsbeck v. Westview Clinic, 375
N.W.2d 861, 870 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
176. Thus, a court could permit recovery in a medical negligence case even where
the plaintiff had less than a 50% chance of recovery. See, e.g., Jeanes v. Milner, 428
F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970). InJeanes, a young boy died of throat cancer after his condi-
tion was misdiagnosed. Expert testimony established that the boy would have had a
35% chance of recovery had the condition been properly diagnosed. Because of the
delay in treatment, his chance of recovery fell to 24%. The case was remanded for
the jury to determine whether the delayed diagnosis was the proximate cause of the
boy's death, thus avoiding the "more probable than not" standard. See id. at 606.
177. Pratt v. University of Minn. Affiliated Hosp. and Clinics, 414 N.W.2d 399,
402 (Minn. 1987). In a thinly veiled attempt to avoid the prohibition against wrong-
ful birth actions in Minnesota, the Pratts' attorney brought their action in negligent
nondisclosure (informed consent). Although treatment should be defined broadly
for the purposes of the doctrine, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that "mere diag-
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In Pratt v. University of Minnesota Affiliated Hospitals and Clinics, 178 a
couple gave birth to a second child with birth defects after genetic
counselors were unable to determine the specific cause of their pre-
vious child's defects.l19 While the counselors could not rule out au-
tosomal recessive causes for the first child's defects, they told the
Pratts it was most likely a " 'sporadic event without genetic implica-
tions.' "180 The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the doctrine
of negligent nondisclosure did not apply to this case involving pre-
conception genetic diagnosis.181
Since the doctrine of negligent nondisclosure has roots in the bat-
tery cause of action,18 2 liability without some kind of "treatment"
has generally been thought to be inappropriate.183 The Pratt court
believed that "treatment" should be given a broad definition.184
nosis, without more, does not give rise to a duty to disclose risks concerning conditions
not diagnosed." Id. (emphasis added).
178. 414 N.W.2d 399 (Minn. 1987).
179. Id. at 400.
180. Id. The record was unclear as to whether both boys suffered from the same
disorder, although both disorders were genetically related. Id. at 401 n.1.
181. While the Minnesota Supreme Court stated the issue as "whether the doc-
trine of negligent nondisclosure ... applies to cases involving genetic diagnosis," id.
at 401, the holding does not appear to totally foreclose the possibility of such an
action. See infra notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
182. The battery doctrine protects the patient against unconsented touchings.
See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905). In Mohr, the patient
consented to surgery on her right ear. In surgery, the physician operated on the
patient's left ear. Id. at 265, 104 N.W. at 13. The patient sued on a battery action,
claiming that the physician touched her left ear without her consent. Id.
Negligent nondisclosure protects the patient against touchings where consent to
treatment was given without knowledge of some risk. See, e.g., Kohoutek v. Hafner,
383 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. 1986); Reinhardt v. Colton, 337 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 1983);
Plutshack v. University of Minn. Hosps., 316 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1982); Cornfeldt v.
Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1980). The battery action was not concerned with
how informed the consent was about risks or alternative treatments, but only with
whether there was consent at all. See generally, Note, Consent to Medical Treatment: In-
formed or Misinformed, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 541 (1986).
183. But see Pratt, 414 N.W.2d at 402 (the court believed "there may be some non-
treatment situations where the doctrine could be applicable").
184. Id. Apparently "treatment" can include diagnosis in some situations. In ge-
netic counseling situations, reasonable prudence may dictate a higher standard of
care where testing is inconclusive and the risk of having an affected child is high due
to the woman's condition, age or the birth of prior affected children. Cf. Helling v.
Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (en banc) (standard of care held to be
higher than normal despite low risk of presence of eye disease). For example, it has
been held that the failure to inform a patient of further diagnostic procedures that
could be undertaken to determine the significance of an abnormality or shed light on
previous inconclusive diagnostic procedures results in liability under the doctrine of
informed consent. See Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919, 924 (1979).
In genetic counseling cases, the further diagnostic procedures would include inform-
ing the patient of ultrasound and amniocentesis testing. Whether the failure to sug-
gest further or additional diagnostic procedures would invoke the doctrine of
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Treatment does not have to involve a touching in the traditional
medical sense, i.e., by a surgical procedure or ingestion of drugs, but
must be something more than "mere diagnosis" for the doctrine of
negligent nondisclosure to apply.185 If recovery in preconception di-
agnosis situations is allowed, the counselor has to inform the patient
of the risks of an incorrect diagnosis without knowledge of the incor-
rect diagnosis. 186
Negligent nondisclosure involves failure to disclose a risk of treat-
ment that the patient should have been informed of prior to giving
consent to treatment.' 8 7 Negligent nondisclosure applies when the
negligent nondisclosure has not been decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court. But
see Kalsbeck v. Westview Clinic, P.A., 375 N.W.2d 861, 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(negligent nondisclosure does not apply to decisions concerning additional, rather
than alternative treatment).
The effect of the two Washington cases has been closely followed by health care
providers and attorneys. See Bell, supra note 124, at 970; Wiley, The Impact ofJudicial
Decisions on Professional Conduct: An Empirical Study, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 345, 384 nn. 132-
33 (1981) (list of legal and medical articles on these decisions). A survey conducted
following the decision in Helling indicated that a substantial number of opthalmolo-
gists had not changed their testing procedures for glaucoma for those under the age
of 40 due to the decision. See Bell, supra note 124, at 970; Wiley, supra at 384. While
the Helling court did not articulate any policy reason for imposing a higher standard,
economic efficiency, strict liability and equal protection were cited by the survey tak-
ers. See Wiley, supra at 385-87.
185. Thus, the Pratt court believed the rule in Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73,
394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), went too far by requiring "affirmative treat-
ment" which was a violation of the woman's "physical integrity." See id. at 82, 394
N.Y.S.2d at 939. The Pratt court refused to draw any bright boundaries. Instead it
merely postulated that there may be non-treatment cases where the doctrine could be
applicable. Pratt, 414 N.W.2d at 402. The court cited with approval reasoning from
Gates
The patient's right to know is not confined to the choice of treatment once a
disease is present and has been conclusively diagnosed. Important deci-
sions must frequently be made in many non-treatment situations in which
medical care is given, including procedures leading to a diagnosis, as in this
case.
92 Wash. 2d at 250-51, 595 P.2d at 922-23. The court found Gates distinguishable
from Pratt, however, because in Pratt the doctors used all available tests and informa-
tion to reach their diagnosis and then proceeded in a manner consistent with the
diagnosis. Pratt, 414 N.W.2d at 402. It is unclear whether the failure to suggest
amniocentesis if indicated in a case with facts similar to Hickman, where the mother
claimed the physician failed to suggest amniocentesis as indicated by her advanced
maternal age, would invoke the Gates reasoning.
186. Pratt, 414 N.W.2d at 402. But in high risk situations, health care providers
may be put on notice by a red flag of warning raised by some abnormality or even
inconclusive diagnostic procedures.
187. In Minnesota, the doctrine was first enunciated in Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262
N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 1977):
[A]n action for negligent nondisclosure will lie if the patient was not properly
informed of a risk inhering in the treatment, the undisclosed risk material-
ized in harm, and consent to the treatment would not have been secured if
the risk were disclosed.
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patient must choose between the recommended treatment and no
treatment at all, or when the patient must choose between two or
more medically accepted alternative treatments.' 88 In preconcep-
tion genetic counseling, the counselor does not purport to make de-
cisions, but only to help an individual to make the best decision for
him or herself through non-directive counseling.189 Holding a ge-
netic counselor liable for lack of informed consent in a situation simi-
lar to Pratt would stretch the doctrine beyond any rational limits.190
The Pratt court implied that informed consent might be applicable
Id. at 699 (emphasis in original). The rationale behind the doctrine is that disclosure
to the patient is necessary to provide free choice in treatment. Id.
188. Pratt, 414 N.W.2d at 401 (citing Kalsbeck v. Westview Clinic, 375 N.W.2d
861, 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)).
189. A good example of directive treatment is the phrase "doctor's orders." With
directive treatment, the doctor tells the patient what to do; with nondirective treat-
ment, the doctor suggests alternatives from which the patient may choose. A debate
over whether genetic counseling should be directive or nondirective has arisen in
recent years. See A. Capron, Genetic Counseling: Facts, Values and Norms, 15 BIRTH DE-
FECrS 169, 169-201 (1979) (a collection of essays on paradigmatic models for genetic
counselors to follow). In the case of Huntington's Chorea, for example, it is argued
that counselors should strongly advise carriers of the gene not to reproduce, since
inheritance from the parent, rather than new mutations, accounts for 95% of the
cases and the symptoms (i.e., progressive, fatal neurological deterioration) do not
manifest themselves until after the childbearing years. See Perry, Some Ethical Problems
in Huntington's Chorea, 125 CAN. MED. Assoc.J. 1098 (1981); see also Evers-Kiebooms,
Decision Making in Huntington's Disease and Cystic Fibrosis, 23 BIRTH DEFEC'rs 115, 115-18
(1987).
190. It has been suggested that genetic counselors could be held liable for errone-
ous advice given prior to conception under the informed consent doctrine. See
Capron, supra note 107, at 626-30. Such a suggestion confuses negligence with in-
formed consent.
[T]he adequacy of genetic counseling methods could be measured under
the doctrine of informed consent. Although no further physical treatment
of a counselee may occur after the genetic diagnosis is conveyed, the basic
aim of the informed consent cases - to render the patient an informed deci-
sionmaker able to participate in his or her own care - is nonetheless appli-
cable to the counseling context.
Id. at 629. What this approach fails to recognize is that if the counselor's duty is to
make a reasonable diagnosis and give it to the parents, breach of that duty is negli-
gence and nothing more. The confusion stems, at least in part, from the use of the
terms "informed decisionmaker" in the counseling context. See Note, supra 2, at
1506-07 n.77.
Although doctors in the context of both informed consent and genetic coun-
seling are not to make the ultimate choice among various courses of action,
they possess information that deciders often cannot otherwise easily obtain.
Indeed, it is usually only through physician disclosure that prospective par-
ents will be given the opportunity to avert the birth of children with genetic
defects. Thus doctors should be required to inform prospective parents of
all the genetic risks and reproductive options that a reasonable person
would want to know in deciding whether to procreate.
Id. at 1507-08. Part of the reason the authors advocate such a standard is out of fear
that some health care providers would intentionally fail to disclose information which
would lead to abortion. See Capron, supra note 107, at 626-30. Because that rationale
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to some situations involving additional, rather than alternative treat-
ment.19' The court quoted Gates v. Jensen,19 2 which allowed an in-
formed consent suit based on a failure to inform a patient of
additional tests for glaucoma. In the genetic counseling arena, liabil-
ity might arise from failure to inform a woman of additional tests,
such as amniocentesis or ultrasound, that could determine after con-
ception if her child suffered from genetic or congenital anomalies. 193
Where the failure to obtain such tests would involve risks that the
physician should be aware of and that a reasonable patient would
consider significant in making a procreative decision, the physician
should be liable if a reasonable person who knew the risk would have
undergone the additional tests and avoided the injury of the result-
ing birth of an affected child.194
While the use of informed consent may be inappropriate in pre-
conception counseling cases, the doctrine should apply to protect
postconception reproductive decisionmaking. A postconception in-
formed consent claim would be brought by a pregnant woman who
is inapplicable to preconception cases, it supports the notion that informed consent,
as a basis for liability, applies in postconception cases only.
Instead, when the very nature of the "treatment" is to disclose risks material to
the couple's decision to have a future pregnancy, the failure to disclose such risks
would give rise to a cause of action in negligence or possibly deceit. Application of
the informed consent doctrine would require the preconception counselor to dis-
close the risks material to the couple's decision to seek counseling or diagnosis
("treatment") not their decision to have future pregnancies. Thus, counselors would
have to disclose that their diagnosis could be wrong. Pratt, 414 N.W.2d at 402. Pro-
fessor Capron has recognized this concept:
The doctrine of "informed consent," is a hybrid; its parentage includes both
battery and negligence actions. In analyzing genetic counseling, negligence
provides the most relevant precedent because the issue is the failure to con-
vey the diagnosis rather than the lack of permission for any "touchings"
involved in making the diagnosis.
Capron, supra note 163, at 588 n.23.
191. See Pratt, 414 N.W.2d at 402.
192. 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979).
193. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
194. Cf. Madsen v. Park Nicollet Medical Cent., 419 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988). The preclusion of injury of birth claims and the informed consent doctrine's
limited expert testimony requirement have spawned other suits using the doctrine in
this area of law. See Public Health Trust of Dade Co. v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla.
1987) (ruptured tubal pregnancy after tubal ligation); Phillips v. Hull, 516 So. 2d 488
(Miss. 1987) (birth after tubal ligation); lafelice v. Zarafu, 221 N.J. Super. 278, 534
A.2d 417 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (physicians who successfully performed
operation to save child with severe brain damage not liable under informed consent
to parents who alleged they would have allowed child to die if informed of child's
poor prospects of regaining intellectual and neurological functioning); Duffey v.
Fear, 121 A.D.2d 928, 505 N.Y.S.2d 136 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (failure to remove
IUD from pregnant woman); Spencer v. Seikel, 742 P.2d 1126 (Okla. 1987) (no duty
to inform woman with affected 24 month old fetus that 3rd trimester abortion per-
missible in other states).
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was prevented from making an informed decision on whether to
abort her fetus because she was not informed of the availability of
prenatal diagnosis techniques or of the risks of her pregnancy. The
treatment is prenatal care, and because the woman is actually preg-
nant it can be argued that the treatment is directive.195 While the
court in Hickman suggested that the woman "assumes certain well-
known risks in childbearing,"196 this suggestion should not relieve
health care providers from the responsibility of informing women of
these risks or of informing women of sophisticated diagnostic tech-
niques that, although known by many, may not be known or under-
stood by some. Since a pregnant woman has a fundamental right to
make an abortion decision with advice from her physician, a preg-
nant woman who is prevented from making that decision because
information has been withheld from her should have a cause of ac-
tion under the doctrine of informed consent. 19 7
195. Since the woman becomes a patient of the physician with a condition, i.e.
pregnancy, it can be argued that the health care provider's advice regarding prenatal
care would be directive. For example, the health care provider might advise the wo-
man on nutrition, exercise and the hazards of drinking and smoking. This advice is
directive. Similarly, if the health care provider advises the woman that her baby will
be born healthy, or remains silent on prenatal diagnosis, it should be interpreted as
directive counseling. Prenatal counseling and diagnosis may have a profound effect
on the decisionmaking of couples at risk. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying
text. Because of the severe implications of the birth of an affected child, postconcep-
tion counseling of couples at risk that does not include information about the risks of
pregnancy and availability of prenatal diagnosis and eugenic abortion should result
in liability under the informed consent doctrine.
196. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 14. Justice Yetka added, "[m]ost adults are fully
aware of the risks of childbearing when the mother is over 30 years old." Id.
197. Many states have used "informed consent" provisions in abortion statutes to
discourage the decision to abort. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text. The
Supreme Court in Bolton, Akron and Thornburgh made it clear that provisions that dis-
courage abortion, rather than informing, advance no legitimate state interest. The
existence of these provisions suggests that the doctrine of informed consent is appli-
cable to postconception treatment situations. Thus, a woman at risk should be in-
formed of all information relevant to her choice of prenatal care, including the risks
involved in her pregnancy and the options of prenatal diagnosis and eugenic abor-
tion. Since the claim is based on a violation of the woman's autonomous decision-
making, rather than a health care provider's negligence as in Hickman, the plurality
opinion of Hickman may be seriously challenged when faced with a postconception
informed consent case. A postconception informed consent claim consists of the fol-
lowing four elements: (1) the pregnant woman was not properly informed of the risk
that her unborn child could suffer from genetic or congenital anomalies; (2) the risk
could have been reduced or eliminated by prenatal diagnosis and, if indicated, eu-
genic abortion; (3) her child was born with genetic or congenital anomalies; and
(4) her consent to prenatal care without prenatal diagnosis would not have been se-
cured had the risk been disclosed. See Cornfeldt, 262 N.W.2d at 684. Although there
are subtle differences between the postconception informed consent claim and the
postconception negligence claim precluded by Minnesota's statute, the damages
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D. Duty to Refer to a Specialist
One of the most disturbing aspects of the Minnesota wrongful
birth statute is that it frustrates the duty of health care personnel to
refer to a genetic specialist when such a referral is required.198
There are a variety of less specialized health care providers who
practice genetic counseling in one form or another. 199 Many general
practitioners, obstetricians and nurses provide some genetic coun-
seling, even when not responding to a specific inquiry.200 Under the
statute, these less specialized practitioners cannot be held liable for
even clearly negligent counseling if correct counseling would only
have lead to the parents' decision to abort the fetus. Such insulation
of less-skilled health care providers can not be countenanced under
law or public policy.
E. Intentional Withholding of Information
Minnesota's statute does not shield health care providers from lia-
bility for intentionally withholding information that would affect the
decision to abort. 20 ' The language only applies to negligence situa-
sought are identical, and thus the informed consent claim may be precluded by the
statute.
198. In Minnesota, if a person involved in the delivery of medical services knows
or should know that a patient's ailment is beyond his or her knowledge, there is a
duty to refer the patient to a specialist. A failure to refer will result in the person
being held to a standard of the specialist. Larsen v. Yelle, 310 Minn. 521, 526, 246
N.W.2d 841, 845 (1976).
199. See Capron, supra note 107, at 622. "In the absence of any form of licensure
or certification, people with diverse backgrounds and orientations toward patient
care can legitimately hold themselves out as genetic counselors." Id. (footnotes
omitted). These health care providers include nurses, social workers and physicians
in the fields of pediatrics, obstetrics, psychiatry and internal medicine. Id. Even
among those specifically trained in genetics, there is great variation in the amount of
training. See Rimoin, The Delivery of Genetic Services, 13 BIRTH DEFECTS 105, 119-21
(1977) (medically trained geneticists (M.D.), Ph. D. human geneticists and M.A. ge-
netic associates may all deliver genetic services).
200. Health care providers who do not describe themselves as genetic counselors
may find themselves viewed as such by patients needing genetic counseling. Capron,
supra note 107, at 622.
Of course, someone who seeks genetic counseling from a nonspecialist -
for example, a general practitioner - cannot complain if that person does
not measure up to the knowledge and skills of a genetic counseling special-
ist, provided, of course, that the person doing the counseling was not negli-
gent in failing to refer the patient to a specialist because the problem was
one that he or she should have known was beyond his or her competence.
Id. at 623 n.17. This is especially true of prospective parents who rely on general
practitioners as their "first, and often sole, source of [genetic information]." Note,
supra note 2, at 1494.
201. See Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 16 (Simonett, J., concurring); id. at 20 (Amdahl,
C.j., dissenting).
19881
45
McAfee: The Injury of Birth: Minnesota's Statutory Prohibition of Postcon
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
tions.2O2 Some doctors, for moral or religious reasons, may not re-
veal information or recommend abortion even if they know a woman
has a high chance of having an affected child.203 An action for such
intentional conduct, however, entails difficult problems of proof that
the postconception negligence action largely avoids.204 In a post-
conception negligence action the patient need only show that but for
the doctor's negligence, the affected fetus would have been aborted. It
202. The purposeful withholding of information important to a patient by a health
care provider is unethical. See Note, supra note 6, at 2025 n.44 (citing THE AMERICAN
COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, STANDARDS FOR OBSTETRIC-GYNECO-
LOGIC SERVICES 98-99 (6th ed. 1985)). In certain circumstances, however, such as
life-threatening situations, doctors may be privileged in withholding information.
Such situations are arising with less and less frequency. See Note, supra note 182, at
559-63.
While the Minnesota statute was interpreted by the concurrence and dissent in
Hickman as only preventing a cause of action for a health care provider's negligence,
the Idaho, South Dakota and Utah statutes fail to distinguish between negligence and
intentional conduct on the part of health care providers. See IDAHO CODE § 5-334
(Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-55-2 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-
24 (1987). As an example, the text of the Utah statute reads:
A cause of action shall not arise, and damages shall not be awarded, on
behalf of any person, based on the claim that but for the act or omission of an-
other, a person would not have been permitted to have been born alive but
would have been aborted.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (1987) (emphasis added). The Utah statute broadly
precludes actions, based on acts or omissions and, thus can be read to preclude ac-
tions based on intentional conduct. None of these statutes has yet faced a constitu-
tional challenge.
203. In Minnesota and many other jurisdictions there is no liability for refusing to
participate in an abortion procedure. See MINN. STAT. § 145.414 (1986) (no person
shall be coerced, held liable or discriminated against for failure to perform an abor-
tion); MINN. STAT. § 145.42, subd. 1 (1986) (no person shall be held liable for failure
to perform an abortion). See also ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(b) (1986); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001, subd. 8 (West 1986); IDAHO
CODE § 18-612 (1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800, subds. 3, 4, 5 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.31-32 (West 1977); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1591 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 121 (West 1983); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 188.105 (Vernon Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-337 to -341
(1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 (1984); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 18-3213(d) (Purdon
1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-44-40 to -50 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-4-204 to -205 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (1978). Where a health
care provider undertakes to perform an abortion or give genetic counseling, how-
ever, liability for negligent or intentional conduct should follow.
204. One commentator has likened the medical malpractice action to a criminal
trial:
In many respects, malpractice litigation, like a criminal trial, is a public deg-
radation ceremony, in which other members of the profession contribute to
the public challenge to a doctor's performance of his vocation. The mal-
practice lawsuit creates a situation in which lawyers, judges, juries, and other
doctors figuratively look over the shoulder of the defendant doctor to evalu-
ate his work. That is likely to be especially onerous for persons, like doc-
tors, to whom independence in work is expected and very important.
Bell, supra note 124, at 984-85.
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is, therefore, the bonus of the postconception negligence action that
prevents the purposeful withholding of information by imposing lia-
bility for negligent withholding of such information.205 While courts
should remain free to refuse to impose liability based on factual dis-
tinctions or some perceived public policy, legislation preventing
postconception injury of birth claims based on intentional conduct
encourages private interference with the right to abortion by taking
away the deterrence of the fact finding process of the courts.2 06
Intentional conduct is, of course, difficult to prove. The plaintiffs
in Christensen v. Thornby unsuccessfully tried to base their wrongful
conception claim on deceit.207 The court held that in such an action
the plaintiff must prove both that the representation made was false,
and that it was made with fraudulent intent.208 In at least one injury
of birth decision, a court has held that the plaintiff stated a cause of
action for fraudulent representation. 209 That case, however, decided
205. ChiefJustice Amdahl stated the proposition more eloquently.
The possibility that a doctor will be held responsible for negligent conduct
stands as a safeguard that the woman will be fully informed. The legisla-
ture's removal of the negligence action safeguard, while not preventing a
woman from actually obtaining an abortion, does harm the complete exer-
cise of a woman's rights under Roe.
Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 19 (Amdahl, CJ., dissenting). In certain postconception
negligence cases the removal of the "negligence action safeguard" inches nearer to
actual prevention of abortion. If a health care provider misdiagnoses a woman's
pregnancy, for example, and the woman does not have time to seek a legal abortion
when she realizes she is pregnant, the only semblance left of her right to choose is
her action against the health care provider, if she is to avoid illegal conduct. A simi-
lar situation arises when a health care provider performs an abortion negligently, and
the fetus remains intact. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (discussing
cases in other jurisdictions based on these scenarios).
206. Although Minnesota's statute does not shield health care providers from in-
tentionally withholding information from a woman, it "constitutes a subtle entry into
that relationship and interference with the informed decisionmaking process." Hick-
man, 396 N.W.2d at 19 (Amdahl, CJ., dissenting).
The concurring opinion in Hickman suggests that this argument is disingenuous
because the statute does not allow the health care provider to withhold information.
This duty is imposed by standards of medical ethics and enforced by intraprofes-
sional sanctions. See id. at 16 (Simonett,J., concurring). But see Bell, supra note 124,
at 988-89 (disciplinary boards have little effect on physician conduct). The "but for"
causation standard is also criticized as allowing "a woman who delivers a handi-
capped baby to choose, hypothetically, post facto, whether or not to have an abor-
tion." Id. This is the general criticism of informed consent cases, where the patients
may also choose post facto whether or not they would have undertaken a particular
treatment route. Further, the concurrence's approach grossly favors the health care
provider's judgment in the abortion decision over the woman's judgment. While Roe
suggests that the woman consult with her doctor in making a decision to abort, the
right to make the decision clearly vests in the woman.
207. Christensen, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620 622 (1939).
208. Id.
209. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 313-14, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 470
(1967).
19881
47
McAfee: The Injury of Birth: Minnesota's Statutory Prohibition of Postcon
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
only the sufficiency of the pleadings and not the proof.2 10 These ac-
tions are difficult to maintain because of the requirement of knowl-
edge on the part of the defendant that his statements are false.
While it is not impossible to prove this element, the difficulty of
proving what is in a person's mind led early courts to disallow such
actions, reasoning that "[t]he thought of a man shall not be tried, for
the devil himself knoweth not the thought of man."21
F. Allowing the Child's Cause of Action
The common justifications for allowing the parents' injury of birth
claims include recognition of a person's right to practice contracep-
tion and a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy, 212 the availability
of preconception diagnosis and counseling and postconception test-
ing that allows health care providers to determine whether a fetus is
affected,213 and the compensatory and deterrent nature of tort dam-
ages. 214 The claims of children born with severe genetic or congeni-
tal anomalies are analytically indistinguishable from claims of their
parents. The infant sues a health care provider for damages result-
ing from being conceived or born with anomalies. Yet in nearly
every state that has decided the issue, it has been held that no cause
of action lies for an infant with such injuries. The states that allow a
child's action, California, Colorado, New Jersey and Washington, 215
210. See id.
211. See D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 4, at
21 (5th ed. 1984) (quoting Y.B. 7 Edw. IV, f. 2, pl. 2).
212. See supra notes 28-51 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 8-27 and accompanying text.
214. It has been argued that holding physicians liable for the injury of birth will
cause them to refuse to perform prenatal diagnosis procedures or increase the cost of
these procedures substantially. Thus, liability might have the unintended effect of
increasing the number of unwanted pregnancies. University of Ariz. v. Superior
Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 588, 667 P.2d 1294, 1302 (1983) (Gordon, V.CJ., dissenting).
Injury of birth cases do not arise with great frequency, however, due to the infre-
quency with which birth defects themselves occur.
It is also argued that the costs seemingly imposed on the defendant will actually
be borne by those using the service because of malpractice insurance, so the deter-
rent effect on health care providers will be minimal. Procanik, 97 N.J. at 358, 478
A.2d at 773. It is a common principle of tort law that the injury be shifted from the
blameless to society at large through insurance. See D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 4, at 24-25 (5th ed. 1984). Since many
hospitals are self-insured, they have strong financial incentives to reduce the number
of malpractice claims brought against their staff. See Bell, supra note 124, at 989-90.
This has been accomplished largely through the use of "risk management" systems,
which identify problem areas and introduce procedures that reduce the risk of recur-
rence. Id.
215. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982)
(hereditary hearing defect, preconception negligence); Continental Casualty Co. v.
Empire Casualty Co., 713 P.2d 384 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (erythroblastosis fatalis,
preconception negligence); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984) (con-
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do so only under severely restricted circumstances. These courts
hold that a child may recover the extraordinary expenses incurred in
its lifetime as a result of its congenital defect, so long as the parents
did not recover those same costs. 2 16 No other damages for the
child's cause of action have been allowed by any court.
Although many courts disallow actions of the child based on the
sanctity of human life,217 including the logical difficulty of holding
that a person is harmed by coming into existence and the difficulty of
ascertaining damages, a suit for wrongful life can be construed in
such a way as to rebut these arguments. 2 18 First, it must be accepted
that a person has a right not to be born into a world of pain and
suffering, without the prospect of pursuing the most basic inter-
ests. 219 The sanctity of human life is denigrated if the basic interests
genital rubella syndrome, postconception negligence); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.,
98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (fetal hydantoin syndrome, preconception
negligence). Viewing the postconception negligence recovery in Procanik as an aber-
ration, all the remaining cases allow the child's action where preconception negli-
gence is involved. Distinguishing between affected children's claims based on
whether the negligence occurred prior to or after conception seems logical. In the
postconception cases, the anomaly is not suspected prior to conception, and is, of
course, undetectable prior to its existence. Thus, the child is already affected prior to
any negligence on the part of the health care provider. Allowing postconception
recovery by the child for its existence may be unsound because the child, or at least
the embryo, existed prior to the negligence. In preconception negligence cases,
however, the injury to the child is not birth, but rather conception. In that case, the
health care provider's negligence does indeed cause the child to exist with anomalies
by inducing the parents to conceive. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106
Cal.App.3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980) (holding that genetic counselors owe a
duty to unconceived child as well as parents). But see Gallagher v. Duke Univ. 638 F.
Supp. 979, 982-83 (1986) (holding that physician owed no duty to child who did not
exist at time of negligence).
216. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 238, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348; Procanik, 97
N.J. at 353, 478 A.2d at 766; Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 474, 656 P.2d at 495.
217. The Phillips court summed up the various arguments against recognizing a
cause of action for wrongful life before focusing on the preciousness and sanctity of
human life as the overriding reason for denying these claims.
Although these arguments are phrased in varying terminology-the 'impos-
sibility' of determining damages based on a comparison of defective exist-
ence with non-existence .... the metaphysical, theological, or philosophical
nature of the issues .... the lack of a 'justiciable' issue .... or the absence of
a legally 'cognizable' cause of action, . . . they essentially focus on the
'preciousness of human life.'
Phillips, 508 F. Supp. at 543 (citations omitted).
218. "[T]he grounds for charging that a wrongdoer has violated another's right
not to be born do not include reference to a strange never-never land from which
phantom beings are dragged struggling and kicking into their mothers' wombs and
thence into existence as persons in the real world." J. FEINBERG, Is There a Right to be
Born? in RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 207, 219 (1980).
219. As Feinberg pointed out:
Talk of a "right not to be born" is a compendious way of referring to the
plausible moral requirement that no child be brought into the world unless
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of living are doomed in advance. 220 Life as protected by the Consti-
tution includes "all personal rights and their enjoyment of the facul-
ties, acquiring useful knowledge, the right to marry, establish a
home, and bring up children, freedom of worship, conscience, con-
tract, occupation, speech, assembly and press." 22 ' The child born
into the world with serious anomalies can hardly be said to take ad-
vantage of life in this legalistic sense. Children born with the most
severe anomalies might not even be able to "take in food, get energy
from it, grow, adapt themselves to their surroundings, and
reproduce their kind." 222 Children brought into existence without
these minimal assurances of well-being have been wronged.223
Second, it should be accepted that a child deprived of many, but
not all, of the basic interests of life has also been wronged. 224 Many
certain very minimal conditions of well-being are assured.... When a child
is brought into existence even though those requirements have not been
observed, he has been wronged thereby; and that is not to say that any meta-
physical interpretation, or any sense at all, can be given to the statement that
he would have been better off had he never been born.
Id. (emphasis in original).
220. See Steinbock, The Logical Case for "Wrongful Life," HASTINGS CENT. REP. 15, 8-
19 (Apr. 1986).
221. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 833 (5th ed. 1979).
222. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1044 (2d ed. 1979). It
might be argued that these children were never "viable" in the strictest sense of the
word. See id. at 2035; see also MosBY MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 778 (1st ed. 1985). The
courts have adopted a much broader definition of the term, defining viability as
"when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb
by natural or artificial life support systems." Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 63-65 (1976).
223. The impact of christianity and the "suffering-based" philosophies of western
cultures has certainly had an effect on the reasoning of some jurists denying the af-
fected child's cause of action. As one author concluded, this impact may not be as
strong in the future:
One of the recent changes in western society is that reproduction has been
quantitatively regulated even to the extent that there is no replacement at
the present time, but also that there is a very big concern about the quality
of the children that are born.
Here we observe that a centuries-long impact of christianity has been
lost in recent years: Man in this society of to-day can no longer find any
sense in suffering, especially when it hits him, on a genetic basis, in his exis-
tential prolongation which is the child.
Van den Berghe, Impact of Genetics on Society, 23 BIwr DEFECTS 1, 3 (1987) (emphasis
omitted).
224. See Steinbock, supra note 223, at 19. The author argues that it is not neces-
sary for the child to have such an impaired condition that nonexistence is preferrable
to life with the handicap.
Either we have to maintain, implausibly, that a rational person would prefer
nonexistence to, say, being born deaf, or we must dismiss the suits of less
seriously impaired children. ...
The escape from this dilemma is to see that it is not necessary to main-
tain that the child would be better off never having been born in order to
claim that he or she has been wronged by birth. Instead, we can say that it is
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children suffering from severe handicaps may lead productive lives if
their expensive medical and educational needs are met. 2 25 It is not
necessary to compare their lives against nonexistence, because the
compensation they seek is for their handicap, not for their exist-
ence. 22 6 While it is often said that the tortfeasor did not cause the
child's handicap, the antithesis of this argument also has merit: but
for the negligent conduct of the tortfeasor, the child, and thus the
handicap, would not exist.
Third, allowing the child to recover in an injury of birth action
assures more certain justice than allowing the parents to recover. In
the strictest sense, it is the child who will suffer enormous damages
as a result of being born with severe anomalies.227 If damages are
awarded solely on the parents' cause of action, no award based on
the child's pain and suffering is possible.228 In the event that the
child is given up for adoption, institutionalized or the parents are
unavailable to sue, will states preclude the infant plaintiff from the
a wrong to the child to be born with such serious handicaps that many very
basic interests are doomed in advance, preventing the child from having the
minimally decent existence to which all citizens are entitled. While this is
something less than a right to be born a whole functional human being, it is
not dependent on the implausible view that a life with serious impairments
is always worse than no life at all.
Id.
225. See id.
226. "The harm complained of is not life, but suffering by a living person, flowing
from negligent conduct .. " Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171,
192 (1982) (Hennessey, C.J., dissenting) (DES case).
227. Although the parents take the risk that a health care provider's negligence
will cause them to conceive or carry an affected child to term, it is the child's interest
that is ultimately harmed.
Genetic risk taking, unlike other personal decisions involving risk, is taken
under the knowledge that an undesirable outcome of one's own decision
will primarily affect another person. While, if the feared outcome of a preg-
nancy were to [materialize], one would have to live with the consequences of
such a decision, one's offspring is the person who would be primarily
affected.
Humphreys & Berkley, supra note 54, at 227.
228. Although no injury of birth case has allowed damages for the child's pain and
suffering, there can be little doubt that these damages exist.
Admittedly these terms refer to subjective states, representing a detriment
which can be translated into monetary loss only with great difficulty .... But
the detriment, nevertheless, is a genuine one that requires compensation ...
and the issue generally must be resolved by the "impartial conscience and
judgement of jurors who may be expected to act reasonably, intelligently
and in harmony with the evidence."
Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 893, 500 P.2d 880, 883, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 856, 859 (1972) (quoting Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 181, 417 P.2d 673,
681, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 137 (1966)). But cf. Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 740
(Minn. 1982) (preventing child's recovery for loss of parental consortium because
"[tihe intangible nature of the child's loss makes it difficult to assess damages").
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very same damages that they allow parents to recover?229 Further,
the child's special costs will often continue beyond the age of major-
ity, placing the eventual burden on the parents or the state. 230 Fi-
nally, the statute of limitations protects the interests of children by
tolling until the age of majority or sound mind.231
VII. THE PROVIDENCE OF PROHIBITING TORT ACTIONS:
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Scientific advances can produce new problems that are thrust upon
the courts and legislatures.232 In 1963, an Illinois court predicted
new causes of action arising as man's knowledge increases and he
wields "ever greater control over the functions of nature." 233 In
holding that the sweeping results of creating a new tort for wrongful
life would be more properly addressed by the legislature, the court
noted that while the legal questions presented are new, "the social
conditions producing the problem have existed since the advent of
man."234
A. Respective Judicial and Legislative Roles
The question of recognition of a cause of action for the injury of
birth has sometimes been considered a matter for legislative, rather
than judicial, decisionmaking:
The establishment of a cause of action based on the matter of
wrongful conception, wrongful life or wrongful birth is clearly
within the purview of the legislature only. The enunciation of pub-
lic policy is the domain of the General Assembly. We do not pro-
pose to invade their jurisdiction in any respect. The courts
interpret the law. They do not enact legislation. 2 35
Upon closer examination, however, it appears that courts are at least
as well-equipped as legislatures to recognize new tort actions. In cir-
cumstances where liability and damages may vary greatly from case
to case, courts may be in a better position to decide because that
system has the unique advantage of being able to hear the specific
facts of each case.
229. Procanik v. Cillo, 97 NJ. 339, 352, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (1984).
230. In some states, the damages recoverable in injury of birth actions involving
affected children are only based on raising the child to the age of majority. See, e.g.,
Bani-Esraili v. Lerman, 69 N.Y.2d 807, 808, 505 N.E.2d 947, 948, 513 N.Y.S.2d 382,
383 (1987). If Minnesota were to recognize such an action, however, the court would
probably follow dicta from the Sherlock decision allowing damages for support of an
affected child to extend beyond majority. Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d 176 n.l 1.
231. See MINN. STAT. § 541.15 (1986).
232. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 253, 190 N.E.2d 849, 859 (1963).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1983).
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It is often argued that since legislatures allowed actions for wrong-
ful death, they should also decide whether to recognize actions for
the injury of birth.236 Yet the differences between legislative accept-
ance of wrongful death suits and legislative prohibition of injury of
birth suits are striking. First, the legislature is prohibiting, rather
than allowing, a cause of action for a person injured by another's
negligence. 23 7 Second, wrongful death statutes allow the decedent's
estate (a third party) to recover, while injury of birth statutes prohibit
recovery to the injured parties themselves.23 8 Although both types
of actions invoke public policy considerations, the resolution of these
considerations in favor of wrongful death plaintiffs actually supports
recognition of injury of birth suits. 23 9 In sum, a comparison between
legislative acceptance of wrongful death and legislative prohibition
of injury of birth actions provides an indication that a legislative so-
lution to the complex issues involved in the latter is neither war-
ranted nor prudent.240
236. See, e.g., Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 11 (1986).
237. The Minnesota Legislature has prohibited other actions based on contract,
under the statute of frauds. See MINN. STAT. § 513.01 (1986) (prohibiting actions for
breach of contract to marry between cohabitants without a written contract). See also
Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 16 n. 1 (Simonett, J., concurring) (list of situations in which
breach of duty owed to another does not result in tort damages).
238. There are principles of law, such as the third party beneficiary rule in con-
tract and emotional distress and loss of consortium rules in tort, which allow persons
indirectly injured by a defendant's conduct some measure of recovery. Legislation
that prevents redress to the injured party for ordinary negligence in toto are not com-
monplace, with the exception of principles of comparative fault (provided the plain-
tiff's fault is greater than the defendant's). Similar principles have not been
persuasive in injury of birth decisions. See Rogers, supra note 163, at 750 (attempts
by defendants to construe parents' sexual intercourse as intervening cause have not
been persuasive).
239. These public policy arguments include the difficulty of ascertaining damages,
increased litigation and determining the respective judicial and legislative roles.
Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 13. The arguments have not been persuasive in precluding
claims by parents for the injury of birth. See supra note 122 and accompanying text
(nearly every post-Roe court reaching the merits of such a case has allowed the ac-
tion). Further, such policy arguments would seem equally applicable to suits involv-
ing failed sterilization procedures or contraception methods, which have gained both
legislative and judicial approval in Minnesota.
240. About the only similarity that can be found between wrongful death claims
and injury of birth claims is that both may involve injuries arising from negligent or
intentional conduct or strict liability. Cf. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 13. Injury of birth
suits may arise from a health care provider's intentional conduct, see supra notes 201-
13 and accompanying text, from a products liability suit against a manufacturer in-
volving a contraceptive device, see Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d
511 (1971), or from negligent conduct.
One final criticism of any legislation preventing a common law cause of action
based on some perceived public policy is that the legislature is in effect interpreting
common law, an inherently judicial function. There were no postconception negli-
gence suits before Minnesota courts prior to this legislation. As a result, the legisla-
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In contrast, the judiciary first recognized injury of birth actions in
Minnesota.241 Because of the fact specific nature of injury of birth
actions, it is more provident for the courts to accept or reject such
actions on a case-by-case basis than to continue with the legislature's
outright prohibition. The Sherlock decision demonstrated the court's
ability to struggle with these difficult issues to reach a fair and just
result. The language of the legislation itself recognizes that ability
and shows confidence in the court's decision. 242
B. A Proposal to Redraft Section 145.424
At the outset, it should be noted that "improvement" of Minne-
sota Statute section 145.424 is unlikely. A statute with perceived
beneficial effects of curbing abortions that has recently been held
constitutional by the Minnesota Supreme Court is not likely to be a
candidate for change in the eyes of the legislators.243 Thus, the fol-
lowing revision is proposed in the event that a further challenge to
the statute's validity is successful or the cultural lag between genetic
counseling technology and morality resolves itself.244 In any event,
the proposal is useful as a way of recapping the major themes of this
Note and demonstrating that careful legislation may arrest some of
the problems inherent in the injury of birth arena without precluding
all recovery.
A legislative solution to the problems with Minnesota's statute
would require repeal of subdivision 2 as well as significant revision of
the other subdivisions. The statute should prohibit any claim by a
child against its parents. It should allow other actions by the child
only in cases of severe physical or mental impairment, thus prohibit-
ing cases for impairment of status (illegitimacy). The statute should
allow claims where negligence induced a woman to carry a severely
handicapped child to term. Finally, the statute should protect de-
fendants from multiple liability for identical damages claimed by
both the parents and the child. This approach would allow the
courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, when the child's impair-
tors had no idea how the court would react to such a situation in terms of liability or
damages. Nor did they have the benefit of the court's reasoning and guidance in an
extremely complicated and controversial area of tort law. Instead, the legislature
forged ahead, throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
241. See supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text (discussing Sherlock).
242. See MINN. STAT. § 145.424, subd. 3 (1986) (codifying the result in the Sherlock
decision).
243. The final vote on the bill was 100 to 20 on February 26, 1982. This is ap-
proximately the same vote breakdown as on other abortion-related bills. Interview
with Representative Linda Scheid (January 10, 1988).
244. See Rogers, supra note 162, at 757. It is a depressing observation that genetic
counseling is increasing at a tremendous rate, but society is not prepared to receive
this information. See Van Den Berghe, supra note 225, at 3.
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ment was severe enough and when the parents' right to procreative
choice was interfered with in such a way as to make liability
appropriate.245
The titles of all subdivisions have been deleted because labelling
these actions tends to confuse and mislead.246 The changes to sub-
division 1 would effectively prevent any lawsuit by a child against its
parents as well as any lawsuit by a child based on impaired status.
The repeal of subdivision 2 would allow actions by women against
health care providers who negligently induced them to carry a child
with severe handicaps to term and actions by women against health
care providers who negligently diagnosed pregnancies or negligently
performed abortions.247 The long first sentence of subdivision 3 is
245. A suggested revision of MINN. STAT. § 145.424 follows:
Prohibition of tort actions
Subdivision 1. Wr.ngful fc.... pr:o h ibted. No person child shall
maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages on behalf of that
per-son based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another the
parents, the per-son child would have been aborted. No child shall maintain a
cause of action or receive an award of damages on the claim that but for the negligent
conduct of another, the child would have been aborted unless the child suffers from severe
physical or mental defects.
Subd. 2. Wrongful birth azet prohibited. No prs shall m.......ta a
eause fEeto ard of danae onte l tha.t bu.t far the
neglgent ...... of a..t. r, a hild ou.ld have .. bee .abr. [Resealed]
Subd. 3. Faiiur or r.f..sal to prevent a liv b.rth. Nothig i. this see
tio shall e eentrdicd to preuea ateo aetion .fer inttioa .t.....
gcnt malpra-ct'cc or any other - rt based or the filr of a
tactvr ethed or scrilizatio preeedure or ana laian that, but for-
.. ,r !.....ita.i.t ofa ethr, tests or tr,..t. .... t...d have; n r re
qVided oF-FA-4~ have een provided preperly whieh w.ould haenad es
.e the ......... .,........ ....... y disa ', dcfczt, defieaency,.
handieap praid. d, ho;,zyzr, that abortion shall not hae bendemd to
The failure or refusal of ay person to perfcrm or a parent to have an abor-
tion, put a child up for adoption, or institutionalize a child shall not be a defense in
any action against a third party, nor shall that failure or refusal be considered
in awarding damages or in imposing a penalty in any such action.
Subd. 4. In the event that both the child and the parents seek damages against a
third party in any action under subdivisions I or 2, any damages awarded shall be offset
to prevent multiple recovery for the same injury.
246. In the case of subdivision 2, the statutory title, "Wrongful Birth Action Pro-
hibited," is particularly misleading because, according to popular definitions, the lan-
guage can be inaccurately interpreted to prohibit both wrongful birth and wrongful
pregnancy actions.
247. At first blush it might seem that adding the words "unless the child suffers
from severe physical or mental defects" to the end of subdivision 2 would improve
the statute. Unfortunately this would effectively bar suits by women who had negli-
gently misdiagnosed pregnancies or negligently performed abortions, resulting in
the birth of unwanted healthy children (commonly referred to as "wrongful preg-
nancy").
This Note maintains that the prohibition of such actions is likely to fail constitu-
tional challenges. In such a case, the woman would face a nearly insurmountable
burden of proof to maintain an action for misrepresentation. See supra notes 208-13.
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deleted as unnecessary because nothing in this revision would pre-
clude actions based on intentional conduct, wrongful conception or
torts in utero.2 4 8 The remaining additions in subdivision 3 protect the
parents from any duty to mitigate damages by aborting their child,
putting their child up for adoption or institutionalizing their child.249
The protection for a health care provider who refuses to perform an
abortion is deleted as redundant in light of Minnesota Statutes sec-
tions 145.42, subdivision 1 and 145.414. Finally, the addition of sub-
division 4 protects a defendant from multiple liability to the parents
and the child for the same injury.250
CONCLUSION
The ability of the medical profession to prevent birth, screen pro-
spective parents for inheritable conditions, and diagnose these and
other conditions early in pregnancy has brought with it a duty of
care. Minnesota's statute has removed the deterrent effect of liability
from health care practitioners for negligence in situations where wo-
men would opt for abortion. Although the Minnesota Supreme
Court has found the statute constitutional, it is clear that the statute
places the financial, physical and emotional burden of raising an un-
wanted child on the family rather than on the tortfeasor, who negli-
This result can hardly be reconciled with the intention or spirit of Roe. Thus, limiting
postconception negligence suits to suits involving infants with severe handicaps is
better left to the courts.
248. By couching the terms of the statute in negligence, it can be inferred that no
cause of action based on intentional conduct is prohibited. Similarly, the result in the
Sherlock decision would not be affected because the statute does not purport to pre-
clude actions based on negligence prior to conception. See supra notes 152-64 and
accompanying text. Finally, claims based on negligence that result in injury to a fetus
or a failure to treat a fetus in utero have traditionally been treated differently than
claims based on negligence preventing abortion. See, e.g., Phillips, 508 F. Supp. at
542-43.
249. This "no duty to mitigate" was first discussed in Sherlock. See supra note 91
and accompanying text.
250. Damage issues in injury of birth cases have been beyond the general scope of
this Note. It is suggested, however, that legislation precluding recovery of certain
damages, rather than entire causes of action, might be more provident. The preclusion of
the parents' damages associated with the pregnancy itself might be unconstitutional
under Griswold and Roe and seems offensive to notions of the reparational, deterrent
and compensatory aspects of tort law.
Legislation may be able to preclude damages for the costs of rearing a healthy
child to the age of majority. These damages, although they flow from the negligent
conduct, seem offensive to the basic notions of family, which the state should foster
and protect. They also seem offensive to concepts of benefits and harm. In addition,
when a healthy child is born, the cost of rearing damages may be further removed
from the actual guarantees of Roe and Griswold. In Minnesota, the preclusion of cost
of rearing damages would effectively overrule a portion of the Sherlock decision and
reinstate the overriding benefits doctrine of Christensen when healthy children are
born.
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gently prevented the woman from making an informed procreative
decision and, in some cases, negligently caused a human being to be
brought into a world of pain and suffering. Thus, the statute may
not only be criticized for its failure to deter negligent conduct, but
also for its failure to provide reparation and vindication for the vic-
tims of the tort: the reluctant parents and, in some cases, a handi-
capped child.
The statute specifically prohibits causes of action brought by a
child or a woman based on the claim that but for the negligence of
another, the child would have been aborted. While the statute pro-
ports to prohibit "wrongful birth" and "wrongful life" actions, it
does not completely eliminate these actions and prohibits other ac-
tions that have commonly been referred to as "wrongful pregnancy."
The plain intent of the statute is to prevent causes of action based on
abortions, either because a woman's pregnancy was misdiagnosed,
an abortion procedure was performed negligently or because a wo-
man was denied information that would have led her to terminate the
pregnancy of a severely handicapped child. The statute prefers to
protect the health care provider's negligence over the woman's right
to procreative choice. This preference disregards the balancing of
interests between the unborn fetus, the woman and the state as set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Roe.
Thus, in states with wrongful birth statutes, the focus of tort ac-
tions for the injury of birth has been shifted from whether a couple's
constitutional right to make procreative decisions has been inter-
fered with to whether there was negligence prior to conception or
postconception negligence that prevented proper treatment of the
fetus in utero. The Hickman court's finding of no state action interfer-
ing with the abortion decision has led to attempts by lawyers to ex-
pand the informed consent doctrine in ways that recover
compensation for the lost rights of women prevented from making
informed procreative decisions. Future injury of birth actions in
states with wrongful birth statutes will require claims that creatively
avoid the abortion issue as well as alternative claims that the statutes
are unconstitutional.
Phillip A. McAfee
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